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XIV
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction to the Issue
Wars frequently make use of new technological advancements. They might be smaller,
incremental developments such as more accurate traditional kinetic weapons like rifles or
missiles, or they might be new types or improved vehicles like drones or stealth bombers.
However new and improved, these kinds of weapons basically are means for achieving the
same goals as before – in many ways it is trivial whether a missile is launched from a
traditional fighter jet, a ship or an unmanned drone piloted from afar. These developments
rarely are uncontroversial, either in a legal or a moral sense. The introduction of firearms
was met by calls of cowardice: instead of bravely meeting and fighting within arm's and
sword's length, the musket allowed for inflicting death and damage from afar.1 Ballistic
missiles made it possible to strike targets beyond the horizon, and now much debate
revolves around unmanned aerial vehicles also known as drones. The laws of war adjust to
the new technical developments. In 1868 the Saint Petersburg Declaration2 banned the use
of explosive projectiles weighing under 400 grammes and since then numerous different
treaties have been concluded to regulate or completely ban the use of different kinds of
weapons.
Especially the modern western societies are highly networked and reliant on computers in
nearly everything ranging from hospitals to factories and from banks to nuclear reactors.
Lest there be any doubt about the pervasiveness of connected devices, in August 2013 the
security company Trustwave issued a security advisory after it found a vulnerability in a
toilet seat. Because of lax security, a malicious user could use a smartphone to open or
close the lid, flush the toilet or activate air-drying.3 The connectivity of devices provides an
attack surface unimaginable just a couple of decades ago. States have increasingly paid
attention to securing the critical infrastructure from cyber attacks but also considered the
1 Felix Reichmann, 'The Pennsylvania Rifle: A Social Interpretation of Changing Military Techniques', 
The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, January 1945 at 6.
2 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 
11 December 1868.
3 Sean Gallagher, 'Smart Toilet Vulnerable to Bluetooth Flushing Hack', Wired, 5 August 2013 
<www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-08/05/toilet-hack-attack>. References to online sources are 
accurate as of 6 January 2014.
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need for offensive capabilities. A state-run cyber army running attacks with direct
consequences in the physical world has come far from the stereotype of the 1990s, an
individual malicious computer enthusiast or a group writing viruses to claim fame among
their peers.
Even though cyber operations have not so far played a major part in any larger conflict, it
has been widely claimed that several countries are faced with vulnerable systems and that
it might only be a matter of time until an enemy – be it a state or a non-state actor such as
a terrorist group – uses its cyber capabilities either as the primary way of attacking or as a
supplementary way to wreak havoc. The consequences of such attacks are by no means
limited to the virtual world and may very well be significant for both civilians and soldiers.
Cyber attacks have several characteristics that separate them from traditional uses of force,
which has implications for applying the existing legal framework on the use of force to
them. A cyber attack might for example last only portions of a second and the source of the
attack might be masked. The legal framework has its roots in the more traditional ways of
waging war between nation-states and some of the problems emanating from cyber attacks
follow the same lines of thought as the issues which have been discussed after the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereafter referred to as the 9/11 attacks) regarding, among
other things, non-state actors and the possibility of pre-emptive self-defence.
Cyber warfare has been a hot issue especially after the events in Estonia in 2007 and the
discovery of Stuxnet, both of which will be introduced in the following pages. The dangers
of cyber attacks have even been compared to the consequences of nuclear war with
hyperbolic tones.4 While it is true that the ultimate worst case cyber scenarios may include
consequences comparable even to nuclear war, focusing on them has the tendency of
misguiding the discussion from the arguably more common and more probable
consequences of cyber operations. To quote former U.S. intelligence chief Michael
Hayden, rarely has something been so important and so talked about with less clarity and
less apparent understanding than this phenomenon.5 While the discussion about cyber
4 For an overview of the problems with Cold War metaphors regarding cyber war, see Noah Shachtman 
and Peter W. Singer, 'The Wrong War: The Insistence on Applying Cold War Metaphors to 
Cybersecurity Is Misplaced and Counterproductive', Brookings Institution, 15 August 2011, 
<www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2011/08/15-cybersecurity-singer-shachtman>.
5 Michael V. Hayden, 'The Future of Things "Cyber"', 5 Strategic Studies Quarterly (1/2011) 3–7 at 3.
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attacks has been especially lively recently, the attacks and threats themselves are not a
completely new phenomenon.6 Already in 1993 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt
envisioned that information technology would be the technological breakthrough to bring
about the 'next major shift in the nature of conflict and warfare'.7
The laws of war are not the only aspect of law being challenged by technological changes.8
The possibility to make exact copies of digital media and easily disseminate them has
challenged the conventional conceptions of copyright and the possibility to gather data in a
scale unimaginable before poses a new kind of test for the protection of privacy, just to
name two obvious examples. On a wider scale, the diminution of the significance of
national borders brought on by the internet makes it more difficult to apply the traditional
concept of territorial jurisdiction.9 Whatever the challenges may be, they neither mean that
the technology is immune to the legal system nor that the legal system is immune to the
technology.10 The same applies to jus ad bellum – the law concerning the resort to force by
states – and cyber operations: the existing rules apply, but they may need to be interpreted
in new ways and supplementary new rules may need to be agreed upon.
In this thesis I will examine the relationship of cyber operations and current international
law in terms of jus ad bellum. First I shall discuss the terminology regarding the subject
and present example cases which I will later refer to. I will then briefly present the history
and evolution of the regulation of war leading from the bellum justum doctrine to the
current system built around the Charter of the United Nations11. Then the much debated
notions of force an armed attack will be examined, both of which are essential to the
question of legality of military action. There is no agreed upon definition for either of the
terms, and both will be discussed in the context of cyber operations. The aim is to
determine if and when cyber operations may constitute a use of force or an armed attack.
6 In fact, September 2013 marked the release of the first history of cyber conflict: Jason Healey and Karl 
Grindal (eds), A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Cyber Conflict Studies 
Association: Arlington, 2013).
7 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Cyberwar is Coming!', in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds), In
Athena's Camp – Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, 
1997), 23–60 at 24–25, reprinted from 12 Comparative Strategy (1993) 141–165.
8 For an overview of the implications of the development of technology to legal systems see Noel Cox, 
Technology and Legal Systems (Ashgate: Farnham, 2006).
9 Cox, Technology and Legal Systems, supra note 8 at 172–173.
10 Cox, Technology and Legal Systems, supra note 8 at 217.
11 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
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After this, I will shortly address the principle of non-intervention and discuss if and how it
complements the jus ad bellum regarding operations falling short of the threshold of force.
Finally, concluding remarks and some views towards the future of the issue will be
presented.
1.2 Terminology
'Cyber warfare' has become an ominous catchphrase used especially in the media but also
in the context of international law in a variety of contexts not all of which are appropriate
or fitting.12 It is very often referred to in situations more aptly described as espionage, be
that commercial or targeted at military intelligence. Just as often it is used in describing
activities of smaller scale with such consequences that they have little if anything to do
with warfare, as in the case of the attacks against Estonia in 2007.13 I will go through some
of the terminology and definitions used in discussing the subject matter as well as argue
what I consider to be their strengths and weaknesses.
'Information warfare' has been used to describe attacks and operations carried out via
computer networks, although it seems that lately the term has been more or less replaced
by first the notion of 'computer network attacks' and now, by 'cyber attacks'. Information
warfare more aptly describes the battle of words and images.14 Hence, the term has more to
do with propaganda than with what now is referred to as cyber operations. This is also how
information warfare has previously and widely been understood.15 Fitting some of the
newer attacks and developments into the concept of information warfare is problematic. It
is theoretically possible to stretch the definition of information so that the target of a cyber
attack is indeed the information resident in the memory of a computer, but it is forced and
far-fetched. Also, it does not seem practical to group together traditional information
warfare (such as propaganda) with newer forms of attacks, such as those targeting
12 Katharina Ziolkowski, 'Ius ad bellum in Cyberspace – Some Thoughts on the “Schmitt-Criteria” for Use 
of Force' in C. Czosseck, R. Ottis and K. Ziolkowski (eds), 2012 4th International Conference on Cyber
Conflict Proceedings (NATO CCD COE Publications: Tallinn, 2012), 295–309 at 296.
13 For a description of the events see infra at 13.
14 Jari Rantapelkonen, 'Informaatiosodan monet kasvot' in Jyri Raitasalo & Joonas Sipilä (eds), Sota – 
teoria ja todellisuus: Näkökulmia sodan muutokseen (National Defence University: Helsinki, 2008) 
at 65.
15 As an example, The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004 defines information warfare as the use of
information environment to influence decision-making, operability and public opinion. Finnish Security 
and Defence Policy 2004, <www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_2160_English_White_paper_2004_1_.pdf> 
at 162.
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industrial control systems and for which the objectives and outcomes are much different.
Attacks against the network infrastructure would fit under the concept of information
warfare more easily, especially if their ultimate aim is to disrupt the flow of information.
Indeed, the communications networks were seen early on as a probable targets of cyber
attacks.16 It has also been argued that cyber operations and computer network attacks
should be understood as one of the main capabilities of information warfare.17 This is a
reasonable claim from the perspective of information warfare, yet it should be clarified that
this should only refer to those cyber operations whose goals pertain to information warfare.
Not all cyber operations have such goals, and those that do not (such as an attack on the air
traffic control system intended to crash aircraft or an attack on industrial control systems
intended to cause an explosion) should not be forced into the category of information
warfare.
Also frequently used is the term 'computer network attack' (or CNA). This is often an
appropriate and aptly descriptive term, but it also seems in some cases too strict regarding
the network part. Some of the critical infrastructure might be disconnected from the
internet or any other network as part of security measures, yet these systems can very well
be – and have been – targeted by a cyber attack. For example one of the main propagation
methods of the Stuxnet malware which hit an Iranian nuclear facility was spreading via
removable USB drives.18 The use of the term 'computer network attack' also seems to be
declining in favour of the term 'cyber attacks'.19 
Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake define cyber warfare as 'actions by a nation-state
to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or
16 Sean P. Kanuck, 'Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law', 37 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1996) 272–292 at 284.
17 See e.g. (in the context of law of armed conflict) Pia Palojärvi, A Battle in Bits and Bytes: Computer 
Network Attacks and the Law of Armed Conflict (The Erik Castrén Institute of International Law, 
University of Helsinki, 2009) at 3, Kari Takamaa, 'Verkkosodankäyntiin liittyviä 
kansainvälisoikeudellisia ongelmia – oikeudellisen sääntelyn perusteiden kartoitusta' in Timo Koivurova
(ed.), Kansainvälistyvä oikeus – Juhlakirja, professori Kari Hakapää (University of Lapland: 
Rovaniemi 2005) 517–549 at 522–523 and Marco Roscini, 'World Wide Warfare – Jus ad bellum and the
Use of Cyber Force', 14 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2010) 85–130 at 91.
18 Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu and Eric Chien, 'W32.Stuxnet Dossier', Symantec Security Response 
Whitepaper, Version 1.4, 11 February 2011, 
<www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossi
er.pdf> at 29. For a more detailed description of Stuxnet see infra at 14.
19 An obvious example is the use of the term by Michael Schmitt, who used the term 'computer network 
attacks' in a 1999 article (infra note Error: Reference source not found) but has since used the terms 
'cyber operations', 'cyber attacks' and 'cyber war(fare)' (see e.g. infra note 190).
5
disruption'.20 It bears resemblance with the definition of a cyber attack set forth in the
Tallinn Manual, a study of international law applicable to cyber attacks published by the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence: 'a cyber attack is an operation – –
that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to
objects'.21 It is, in other words, a cyber operation whose consequences are expected to
exceed a certain threshold. A cyber operation is defined in the Tallinn Manual as the
'employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or
by the use of cyberspace'.22 Clarke and Knake refer to 'warfare' whereas the Tallinn Manual
defines 'attacks'. The difference is explained by context: Clarke and Knake talk about war
in a broader, more traditional sense and in its definition the Tallinn Manual discusses
individual attacks or operations. For the purposes of this thesis, I will subscribe to the
definition of cyber operation set forth in the Tallinn Manual and use the term cyber
operation to describe a variety of actions targeting computers and networks without
prejudice to their legality or illegality.
Another kinds of suggestions have been made as well, such as defining 'cyber warfare
operations' as 'the use of network-based capabilities of one state to disrupt, deny, degrade,
manipulate or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the
computers and networks themselves, of another state'23. This, however, seems on the one
hand too broad: 'denying' information may be seen as referring to for example denial-of-
service attacks, which generally should not, as will be discussed later in further detail, be
seen neither as uses of force nor armed attacks.24 On the other hand, it seems too strict.
Limiting the acts to those done to computers of another state seems counterproductive as
much of the infrastructure is privately owned and such civilian networks or computers can
in certain cases be legitimate military targets.25
20 Richard A. Clarke – Robert K. Knake, Cyber War – The Next Threat to National Security and What to 
Do About It (HarperCollins: New York, 2010) at 6.
21 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 106. The term is defined in the context of international 
humanitarian law and in reference to the term 'attack' used in the Geneva Conventions.
22 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 258.
23 Arie J. Schaap, 'Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under International Law', 64 Air 
Force Law Review (2009) 123–173 at 127. The definition is based on an older version of a U.S. 
Department of Defense Dictionary of Military & Associated Terms.
24 Infra at 63.
25 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 128–129, applying Article 27 of the Hague Regulations 
(Convention [IV] Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, in force 
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The translation of the relevant terms presents another terminological challenge and the lack
of agreed upon terms and concepts complicates international co-operation. Such key terms
and concepts as 'cyber warfare' or 'information warfare' have different meanings in English,
Russian and Chinese, and there are terms for which no clear equivalent exists in other
languages. For example the Russian terminology includes the broad notion of an
'information weapon', which refers to, among other things, mass media propaganda. This
relates to the notion of 'information warfare', whose meaning in Russian and Chinese
differs from the one in English and is more broad and holistic.26 Such issues have made it
difficult to agree on common definitions,27 and would arguably make it even more difficult
to for example bring about a treaty on the issue of cyber attacks.
1.3 Applicability of the Existing Rules
There seems to be an emerging consensus that even though cyber attacks have certain
special characteristics that set them in some ways apart from kinetic uses of force, the
principles of international law apply to them as well.28 The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that the United Nations Charter
provisions on the use of force apply to any use of force regardless of the weapons
employed.29 In the realm of jus in bello – the law concerning the conduct of hostilities –
a similar concept is expressed in the so-called Martens Clause, which was first formulated
in the preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention II30 and restated in 1977 in its modern form
in Article 1(2) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions:31 'in cases not
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants
remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
26 January 1910) to a cyber context.
26 Keir Giles and William Hagestad II, 'Divided by a Common Language: Cyber Definitions in Chinese, 
Russian and English' in K. Podins, J. Stinissen, M. Maybaum (eds), 2013 5th International Conference 
on Cyber Conflict Proceedings (NATO CCD COE Publications: Tallinn, 2013), 413–429 at 420–422.
27 Giles and Hagestad, Divided by a Common Language, supra note 26 at 416–417.
28 See e.g. Harold Koh, 'International Law in Cyberspace', 54 Harvard International Law Journal Online 
(2012) at 3 and Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 75–76.
29 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 22 at 
para. 39.
30 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, in force 
4 September 1900.
31 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, in force 7 December 1979, 
1125 UNTS 3.
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from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public
conscience'. The International Court of Justice referred to the clause in the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion and stated that it has proved to be an effective means of
addressing the rapid evolution of military technology.32
States have taken a similar position as well: for example the United States Cyber Strategy
notes that existing international law does apply in cyberspace in times of peace and of
conflict but recognizes the need for additional clarification regarding some of the unique
aspects of cyber operations.33 The strategy also states that the United States will respond to
hostile acts in cyberspace as to any other threat.34 China has taken a similar position,
perhaps more underlining the need for revision and clarification.35
There have been calls for a specific convention on cyber warfare (or information warfare in
general),36 and such calls are not entirely without merit. There is for example an especially
grey area under the threshold of force or an armed attack and regulating the acts falling to
that category would certainly benefit from a new convention. Another area that would
probably benefit from a treaty is the use of civilian contractors to carry out cyber attacks.
This, however, is not a question specifically and exclusively related to cyber operations:
the use of contractors has been the subject of a debate especially after the use of private
military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq during the post-9/11 war on terrorism.37
One argument for the insufficiency of current international law and the need for a
completely new treaty system is based on the non-physical nature of the cyber domain.38
32 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29 at para. 78.
33 The United States International Strategy for Cyberspace – Prosperity, Security and Openness in a 
Networked World, May 2011, 
<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf> at 9.
34 The United States International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 33 at 14.
35 Li Zhang, 'A Chinese Perspective on Cyber War', 94 International Review of the Red Cross (2012) 801–
807 at 804.
36 See e.g. Daniel B. Silver, 'Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under Article 2(4)', 76 U.S. 
Naval War College International Law Studies (2002) 73–97 at 94 and Oona Hathaway, Rebecca 
Crootof, William Perdue and Philip Levitz, 'The Law of Cyber-Attack' in 100 California Law Review 
(2012) 817–885 at 877 and more in the context of law of armed conflict, Davis Brown, 'A Proposal for 
an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict', 47 Harvard
International Law Journal (2006) 179–221.
37 See e.g. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, 'Business Goes to War: Private Military/Security Companies and 
International Humanitarian Law', 88 International Review of the Red Cross (2006), 525–572.
38 Duncan B. Hollis, 'Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations', 11 Lewis & 
Clark Law Review (2007) 1023–1061 at 1039–1040 and Bradley Raboin, 'Corresponding Evolution: 
International Law and the Emergence of Cyber Warfare', 31 Journal of the National Association of 
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Such a view overemphazises the disconnect between the cyber domain and the four other
domains of warfare – land, sea, air and space. While some operations indeed can be carried
out so that they have implications exclusively in the cyber domain, it is particularly the
physical consequences of the attacks that have been at the centre of the discussion and can
cause significant devastation. Another call of insufficiency rests upon the claim that the
United Nations Charter system places too much reliance on the concepts of sovereign
control and the established state responsibility, which are somewhat problematic in the
context of cyber operations.39 Such a claim is indeed not unfounded, yet it too much
disregards the possibility of overcoming the challenges within the current system. It also
places much faith on a political level in the possibility of reaching a new treaty and on a
legal level in the possibility of finding a solution that would not lead out of the frying pan
into the fire.
Administrative Law Judiciary (2011) 602–668 at 625.
39 Scott Shackelford, 'From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law', 
27 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009) 192–251 at 197–198.
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2 Evolvement of War and Cyber Attacks
2.1 Evolvement of the Notion of War
The emergence of cyber attacks and the problem of categorizing them as warfare relates to
the more broad discussion about the definition of war and its evolvement. Lassa
Oppenheim's definition of war from the beginning of the 20th century is an example of
a traditional one. He defines war as 'the contention between two or more states through
their armed forces for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such
conditions of peace as the victor pleases'.40 The nature of warfare has changed considerably
since the days of Oppenheim, and there have been several efforts to modernize the
definition of war. Yoram Dinstein provides one version, and defines war as 'a hostile
interaction between two or more States, either in a technical or in a material sense'. He
considers war in a technical sense to be a formal status following a declaration of war. War
in the material sense is about the actual use of armed force, 'which must be comprehensive
on the part of at least one party to the conflict'.41 The requirement of comprehensive force
seems to be meant to distinguish incidents of smaller scale from war. Even though
the definition of Dinstein is a more modern one, it still is firmly based in the traditional
concept of nation-states waging war against each other.
The time period from the end of the Second World War has been marked by several
changes in the context of war, among which is a shift in the terminology: large scale
hostilities have increasingly been referred to as armed conflicts instead of wars.42 The end
of the Cold War opened up the paradigm of war for change and much of the changes
indeed have happened since the end of the Cold War.43 These include a reduction in the
number of wars, especially the inter-state wars, and the geographical focusing of war to
40 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law – A Treatise. Volume II: War and Neutrality (Longmans, Green 
and Co.: London, 1906) at 56.
41 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (5th Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
at 15.
42 Elzbieta Mikos-Skuza, 'International Law's Changing Terms: “War” Becomes “Armed Conflict”' in 
Mary Ellen O'Connell (ed.), What Is War? An Investigation in the Wake of 9/11 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: Leiden, 2012) 19–29 at 23.
43 Jyri Raitasalo, 'Läntinen sodan kuva kylmän sodan jälkeen' in Jyri Raitasalo and Joonas Sipilä (eds), 
Muuttuva sota (National Defence University: Helsinki, 2005) 101–125 at 101.
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certain regions. Intra-state conflicts have been relatively prevalent, and increasingly
professionalized armies have taken advantage of new military technology.44
In a sense, the post-Cold War era ended after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.45 After the attacks,
transnational terrorism has risen to the forefront of the threat debate and the notion of war
has become even more diffuse and ambiguous.46 The attacks were labelled as an 'act of war'
by U.S. president George W. Bush on the day following the attacks,47 and the response was
labelled a 'war on terror'.48 The attacks were also referred to as 'acts of war against the
United States of America and its allies' in the U.S. National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism of February 2003.49
War has not only been used to describe combat but also struggles of different kinds, such
as the war on drugs. David Kennedy distinguishes wars of combat from wars of metaphor
and notes that their distinction has blurred. An example of this blurring is the
aforementioned war on terror: the opponent is more indeterminate yet the war is fought
with military force. The debate about whether the terrorist detainees should be treated as
prisoners of war, unlawful enemy combatants or criminals is also indicative of this.50 All
this points to the fact that the traditional concept of war has fragmented since the end of the
Cold War and no clear and uniform concept has emerged in its place.51
The cyber world has often been described as the fifth domain of warfare, the newest
addition to those of land, sea, air and space.52 Such a characterization is, however,
somewhat misleading.53 In reality, the cyber domain is is not disconnected from the other
four but quite the opposite, as it is closely related to them and forms an integral part of
44 Janne Malkki, 'Kuinka sota muuttuu?', Kosmopolis Vol. 37:3/2007, 42–58 at 49.
45 Raitasalo, Läntinen sodan kuva kylmän sodan jälkeen, supra note 43 at 107.
46 Raitasalo, Läntinen sodan kuva kylmän sodan jälkeen, supra note 43 at 114.
47 BBC News, Text of Bush's Act of War Statement, 12 September 2001, 
<news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1540544.stm>.
48 Address by President Bush to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, 20 September 2001, in Selected 
Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001–2008, <georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf> 
at 68.
49 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, <www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-
the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf> at 1.
50 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton University Press, 2006) at 3–4. 
51 Raitasalo, Läntinen sodan kuva kylmän sodan jälkeen, supra note 43 at 122.
52 See e.g. 'War in the Fifth Domain', The Economist, 1 July 2010, 
<www.economist.com/node/16478792>.
53 For a more detailed critique of such a view, see Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) at 165–166.
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them: for example many kinetic weapons and communications systems utilize computer
networks.54 Further discussion of the development of the concept and definition of war is
outside the scope of this thesis, but suffice it to say that the emergence of cyber attacks is
a part of the evolution and continuum of armed conflict and warfare. Like other similar
developments, it too has implications for the regulation of war.
2.2 History and Types of Malware and Cyber Attacks
Malicious software, malware in short, has existed since the 1970s and spread on floppy
disks and through bulletin board systems well before the internet was widely used.
The early 2000s saw several widespread computer virus epidemics such as Love Letter,
Code Red, Nimda and MyDoom.55 These viruses were of varying levels of sophistication
and generally their goal was to spread as wide as possible without a specific target. Some
deleted or stole data from infected machines, some made their existence known in other
ways and some were relatively unobtrusive. Another form of computer attacks are the more
targeted strikes, such as the 2011 attack on Sony's PlayStation Network which resulted in
the theft of credit card and other information of over 77 million users and an outage of
almost a month.56 Popular attacks have consisted of defacing the public websites of news
organizations or governments or faking login sites in order to get login credentials from
users. Some attackers might have been after sensitive or confidential information ranging
from credit card information to nude photos of celebrities, some were after fame.
These kinds of viruses and attacks have generally been the product of individuals or groups
and have not required very much resources, apart from time and skill. In the past few years
however, much more carefully crafted attacks have been discovered. Some have even been
so sophisticated and required so much resources to develop that computer security analysts
all but agree that they must be a product of a state or at least the development must have
been sponsored by a state.
54 Jarno Limnéll, 'Defining the Qualities of Cyber Warfare', SC Magazine, 11 March 2013, 
<www.scmagazine.com/defining-the-qualities-of-cyber-warfare/article/283902/>.
55 For an overview of the different epidemics see e.g. Brian Krebs, 'A Short History of Computer Viruses 
and Attacks', The Washington Post, 14 February 2003, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A50636-2002Jun26.html>.
56 Charles Arthur and Keith Stuart, 'PlayStation Network Uses Fear Identity Theft After Major Data Leak', 
The Guardian, 27 April 2011, <www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/27/playstation-users-
identity-theft-data-leak>.
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Yoram Dinstein lists four different types of cross-border cyber operations depending on
who carries them out: 1) attacks conducted by individual persons, 2) attacks conducted by
terrorists unsupported by a state, 3) attacks conducted by terrorists overtly or covertly
supported by a state and 4) attacks conducted by official organs of a state.57 The first two
categories are generally issues for the national law enforcement authorities, unless the state
where the attacks originated from knowingly allowed its territory to be used for such acts.
This would be contrary to the obligation not to allow such activity articulated by the
International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case.58 International law comes in
regarding the latter two cases. Dinstein further divides the cyber acts of states to three
categories: espionage, computer network attacks without human casualties or significant
property damage and computer network attacks with human casualties or significant
property damage.59
2.3 Examples of Cyber Attacks
2.3.1 Attacks Against Estonia in 2007
In 2007 the Estonian government decided to relocate a Soviet World War II memorial – the
bronze soldier statue, considered by many to be a symbol of the Soviet occupation of
Estonia – from the centre of Tallinn to a nearby military cemetery. The move sparked mass
protests mostly among ethnic Russians in the country and was the backdrop for a
widespread cyber attack on Estonian websites, including those of the Estonian government,
the parliament, banks and newspapers.60 Technically the attacks were fairly straightforward
distributed denial-of-service61 (DDoS) attacks but they were carried out in a coordinated
and organized fashion simultaneously on several targets, on a previously unseen scale, and
for an unusually long period of time. There has been speculation of the involvement of the
Russian authorities but the Kremlin has consistently denied any participation and the
57 Yoram Dinstein, 'Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense', 76 U.S. Naval War College 
International Law Studies (2002) 99–119 at 103–104.
58 The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1949, p. 4 at 22.
59 Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, supra note 57 at 105.
60 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents – Legal Considerations (NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence: Tallinn, 2010) at 15.
61 A distributed denial-of-service attack consists of multiple computers flooding the target with malicious 
traffic in order to prevent it from serving legitimate clients. For a closer explanation, see infra at 17.
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Estonian authorities stated after the incident that they had no evidence that the Russian
government was behind the attacks.62
The attacks have been widely used in the media as an example of cyber warfare,63 but
calling them an instance of war is an exaggeration. The first wave of the attacks targeted
a group of public websites which were inaccessible because of the traffic flood.64 Being
unable to access a newspaper website is more aptly described as a nuisance than an act of
war. The attacks have also been described as cyber riots,65 which seems more appropriate.
The attacks did also target the servers running the domain name system66 of internet service
providers. This caused some disruption to the Internet traffic in parts of Estonia, but the
attacks did not target critical infrastructure systems.67 The attacks also targeted the e-
banking services of the two largest banks in Estonia causing outages of 1,5–2 hours.
The question of how the attacks appear in light of the Charter of the United Nations and
the relevant rules of customary international law will be discussed in the following
chapters.
2.3.2 Stuxnet
In June 2010 a Belarusian computer security company VirusBlokAda discovered a piece of
malicious software later named Stuxnet. In the following months it became clear that
Stuxnet was a highly sophisticated program which targeted only specific types of
computers and seems to have spread mainly to certain countries, with an unusually high
prevalence in Iran.68 The consensus among security researchers is that the targets of the
malware were Iranian nuclear facilities, first and foremost an uranium enrichment facility
near the city of Natanz. The malware tampered with the enrichment process by causing
the centrifuge rotors to speed up and slow down abnormally with the probable intention of
62 'Estonia Has No Evidence of Kremlin Involvement in Cyber Attacks', Ria Novosti, 6 September 2007, 
<en.ria.ru/world/20070906/76959190.html>.
63 See e.g. Ian Traynor, 'Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia', The Guardian, 
17 May 2007 <www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia>.
64 Clarke and Knake, Cyber War, supra note 20 at 13–15.
65 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, supra note 60 at 18.
66 The DNS (domain name system) servers are often described as a sort of a phonebook of the internet: 
they match the domain (e.g. google.com) with the numerical IP address of the server so that the client 
computer knows where to connect.
67 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, supra note 60 at 21.
68 According to the internet security company Symantec, almost 59% of the Stuxnet infections were found 
in Iran <www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99>. 
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causing vibrations that would either destroy or severely damage the centrifuges. Stuxnet
apparently succeeded in causing some delays and disruptions in the uranium enrichment
process but failed to cause any catastrophic damage.69 Then again, subsequent analysis has
shown that this might have been the intention of the creators of Stuxnet, for the malware
had certain built-in limitations and safeguards and could apparently have caused more
damage without them.70
In November 2013 security researcher Ralph Langner published a report on Stuxnet and
described how the attack described above was only the second phase of the operation and
was in fact preceded by a stealthier version which aimed to cause damage to the
centrifuges by increasing their pressure. Langner argues that instead of causing
a simultaneous destruction of hundreds of centrifuges – which would apparently have been
possible – the attacker opted for a more surreptitious approach and seems to have strived to
increase stress on the centrifuge rotors in order to shorten their lifespan without causing
suspicion of any foul play. In 2009, after such an approach, the previously described more
well known and less stealthy attack was launched. Nevertheless, this time too the attacker
seems to have preferred an approach of somewhat less damage over a longer period of time
compared to a simultaneous destruction of more centrifuges. Without the less stealthy
version, Langner argues that the malware might never have been discovered.71
In a technical sense Stuxnet was in many ways exceptional. It used four different so-called
zero-day vulnerabilities72 to gain access to the computers it infected. To put this into
perspective, a threat using even one zero-day vulnerability is described by the computer
security company Symantec as 'quite an event'. Using four of them is highly extraordinary
and unique to Stuxnet.73 The attack was a wake-up call in the sense that it underscored and
69 Kim Zetter, 'How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History', 
Wired, 7 November 2011, <www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-
stuxnet/all/>. The article refers to the International Atomic Energy Agency and its estimates that 
between 1 000 and 2 000 centrifuges were replaced during few months at Natanz. The normal 
decommission rate would have been around 800 centrifuges per year.
70 Ralph Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge – A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve, 
November 2013, <www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf> at 15.
71 Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge, supra note 70 at 10.
72 Zero-day vulnerabilities refer to previously unknown vulnerabilities, meaning the developers have had 
zero days to patch them.
73 Liam O Murchu, 'Stuxnet Using Three Additional Zero-Day Vulnerabilities', Symantec Official Blog, 
14 September 2010, <www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-using-three-additional-zero-day-
vulnerabilities>.
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brought to the limelight the fact that it was indeed quite possible for a cyber attack to cause
physical damage. Whether or not this damage was sufficient to classify the attack as a use
of force or an armed attack will be examined in the corresponding chapters below.
The origin of the malware has not been officially confirmed, although several reports claim
that the United States and Israel were behind it. The New York Times reported in June 2012
that Stuxnet was a part of an operation codenamed Olympic Games which began during
the George W. Bush administration and has since been continued by president Obama.
Security analysts pointed fairly quickly after the attack that the malware was so
sophisticated that its crafting had required considerable resources, basically only available
to a nation-state.74
2.3.3 Red October
In October 2012 the Russian computer security company Kaspersky Lab discovered
a piece of malware later dubbed Red October (or Rocra). While the aforementioned attacks
had the goal of disrupting or destroying either communications, data or ultimately even
physical objects, Red October was an intelligence gathering tool. The malware spread via
targeted spearphishing attacks75 and it was exceptional in the sense that it had been active
for an unusually long period of time, at least five years. The main targets of the attack
included governments, embassies and research institutions and victims of the malware are
spread around the world.76
As the main function of Red October seems to have been intelligence gathering, a closer
inspection of it is outside the scope of this study. It is mentioned as an example of the
variety of the possible cyber attacks and also to present the issue of possible difficulty in
determining the aim of the attack after a breach has been discovered. Red October was in a
74 Langner, To Kill a Centrifuge, supra note 70 at 20. See also news articles Josh Halliday, 'Stuxnet worm 
is the “work of a national government agency”', The Guardian, 24 September 2010, 
<www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/sep/24/stuxnet-worm-national-agency> and Kim Zetter, 
'Blockbuster Worm Aimed for Infrastructure, But No Proof Iran Nukes Were Target', Wired, 
23 September 2010, <www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/09/stuxnet/>.
75 Spearphishing attacks are specifically targeted: an attack might for example be carried out by sending an
e-mail to someone in the target organization with an infected attachment file. The e-mail may be masked
as coming from someone familiar to the receiver and the content of the message may be customized to 
coax the receiver into opening the malicious attachment.
76 '”Red October” Diplomatic Cyber Attacks Investigation', Kaspersky Lab SecureList, 14 January 2013. 
<www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792262/Red_October_Diplomatic_Cyber_Attacks_Investigation>.
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sense a passive tool, lurking in the background and gathering information and passing it
on. Theoretically, the same vulnerabilities that it used to intrude the systems could have
been used to launch a more active piece of malware with more destructive consequences,
and depending on the targeted computers, perhaps even physical damages. This, combined
with the fact that examining and reverse engineering the discovered breaches may be time-
consuming, may pose challenges for pondering the appropriate and legal response to
the attacks.
2.4 Technical Aspects of the Attacks
While many of the technical details of cyber operations are not relevant to the application
of international law, it is necessary to outline some general aspects regarding the
techniques of different attacks. The aforementioned cases of Estonia and Stuxnet highlight
two vastly different technical concepts behind computer attacks. In terms of their technical
sophistication, the former may perhaps be compared to storming a town with thousands of
soldiers, or perhaps to firing thousands of artillery rounds in the general direction of the
target. In other words, the attack is in a technical sense rather simple. The latter, on the
other hand, compares to a special operations mission carried out by a team of highly
trained individuals with detailed intelligence on the target. Thomas Rid sees cyber weapons
as spanning a spectrum reaching from generic but low-potential tools – such as the ones
used in the case of Estonia – to specific but high-potential ones – such as Stuxnet – and
uses paintball guns as an example of the generic, low-potential kind: they are easily
available, getting hit is highly visible but the effects are not especially permanent.77
The Estonian websites were hit with a distributed denial-of-service attack. The aim of
a denial-of-service attack is to saturate the bandwidth and/or the computing capacity of the
target so that legitimate traffic cannot get through. A single user with a handful of
computers cannot do much damage by such attacks, which is why the more common
variant is a distributed denial-of-service attack carried out through a so-called botnet. The
botnet consists of hundreds or thousands of malware-infected computers whose resources
and bandwidth the attacker controls remotely to attack the target, perhaps unbeknownst to
the owner or user of the computer. The attacks may also be coordinated so that individual
77 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, supra note 53 at 36.
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users knowingly take part in a denial-of-service attack. This requires very little technical
skill or resources, and in fact ready made software is available which makes taking part in
an attack as simple as entering a URL address (such as google.com) or an IP address of the
target.78 These kinds of attacks do not require nor do they crucially benefit from resources
of a state. The attacks cause problems mainly during the active attack phase when the
target site is inaccessible due to the malicious traffic. When the traffic wounds down the
site normally starts responding again.
Malicious pieces of software or malware, such as Stuxnet, are programs that take
advantage of a vulnerability – basically an error in the code – of another piece of software
(such as Microsoft Word or Java) or an operating system (such as Windows). The
vulnerability allows for an attacker to insert the malware into the targeted computer or a
network. From here, the malware may propagate autonomously to another computers with
the same vulnerability. The malware may find its way onto the computer for example via a
malicious e-mail attachment or a website or an infected USB drive. The malware might
allow for the attacker to use the computer as a part of a botnet, it might allow for access to
the webcam of the computer, it might delete all the files on the computer or it might allow
for the attacker to send customized commands to a uranium centrifuge at a nuclear facility,
the possibilities are practically limitless. It should also be mentioned that once the
vulnerability is made public, it loses its value as the software may be patched and the
vulnerability fixed.79 This means that the malware used in an attack is essentially a one-off
weapon if it is detected. The more significant the intended and inflicted consequences are,
the more visible the attack is and the more likely it is that the used vulnerabilities will
become public.80
As discussed, Stuxnet was a highly customized and very sophisticated piece of software
intended to infect only certain machines. In fact, if the malware found its way to
78 An example of such software is the Low Orbit Ion Cannon application which was used by the hacktivist 
network Anonymous in for example targeting organisations that cut off services from Wikileaks in 2010.
79 As vulnerabilities are practically essential for getting the malware onto a system, a lucrative market has 
developed for them. According to a Forbes article in March 2012, the price for a zero-day exploit for the
Windows operating system varied between 60 000 and 120 000 U.S. dollars. Andy Greenberg, 
'Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers' Secret Software Exploits', Forbes, 23 March 2012, 
<www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-
secret-software-exploits/>.
80 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, supra note 53 at 168.
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a computer that did not match certain properties, it shut itself down.81 Attacks like it are
able to cause significant direct physical damage: speeding up and slowing down
centrifuges might severe them, opening up the floodgates of a dam might damage the dam
or cause flooding. A more indirect form of physical damage is possible as well: tinkering
with traffic lights or the air traffic control system might cause accidents.
Another technical issue worth noting especially related to figuring out the origin of
the attack, or requiring states to block malicious traffic from their network infrastructure, is
the structure of the internet and they way traffic is routed. If a user located in Finland
wants to access a web page stored on a server in Great Britain, he or she normally has no
way of controlling what route the packets delivering the data back and forth will take. The
request for the page might first head on a submarine cable from Helsinki to Sweden, but
depending on the network conditions, it might just as well head south to Estonia, or it
might be routed through land-based cables via St. Petersburg. The data may easily pass
through a dozen of servers along the way, and if one of the servers along the way would
get disconnected, the data would automatically be rerouted through another connection. It
is also possible for the user to deliberately reroute the traffic through different servers and
encrypt it on the way in order to try to hide the origin of the traffic. This makes it difficult
if not impossible to trace the traffic back to its true origin.82
Fully securing computers against cyber attacks is practically impossible. The sheer
complexity of the software guarantees that the total prevention of exploitable
vulnerabilities is not feasible in practice. And as the saying in the industry goes, the attacks
never get worse, they only get better. This combination assures that the race between
the development of the attacks and the protection from them will continue as heated as
ever. Because of this, the notion of cyber resilience has found its way into the discussion:
that is, in addition to securing the systems from attacks, states and private actors aim to
prepare themselves to mitigate the consequences of possible attacks as far as possible.83
81 Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, supra note 69.
82 For examples of the difficulties in practice see e.g. Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, supra note 53 
at 144–145.
83 See e.g. Finland's Cyber Security Strategy, 
<www.yhteiskunnanturvallisuus.fi/en/materials/doc_download/40-finlandas-cyber-security-strategy> 
at 4, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace 
(JOIN[2013] 1 final), 7 February 2013, 
<ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=1667> at 5–7 and The 
United States International Strategy for Cyberspace, supra note 33 at 18–19.
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3 Regulation of the Use of Force
3.1 General Notions About War and Its Regulation
War, according to the famous Clausewitzian expression, is the continuation of politics by
other means.84 And that is what war was for a lengthy period of human history: a regular
form of state behaviour.85 The rules concerning war were few and far between and – in the
Western culture – discussed by Christian theologians such as St. Augustine in the turn of
the 5th century and Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. They were influential thinkers
contributing to the bellum justum doctrine which set out the conditions for a just war.86 The
original traces of the distinction between bellum justum and bellum injustum lead further
back to the Roman Kingdom.87 According to Aquinas, for a war to be just, it had to fulfil
three criteria: it had to be conducted under the authority of a sovereign (that is, not
privately), there had to be a just cause for the war, and those waging war had to have
the right intention to advance good and to avoid evil.88
In the 16th century the Spanish colonization of the Indies and a debate about the
justification of the actions of the conquistadors provided a spark for the emergence of
modern international law at the University of Salamanca.89 In the following decades De
Jure Belli (1598) by Alberico Gentili and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1623) by Hugo Grotius
were published, both of which discussed the laws of war extensively and drew a distinction
between theology and international law.90 The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the
beginning of the era of the modern, independent nation-states and the end of the religious
wars between Catholic and Protestant countries.91 The 15th and 16th centuries were also a
84 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1963) at 22.
85 Kari Hakapää, Uusi kansainvälinen oikeus (Talentum, Helsinki, 2003) at 411.
86 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 66.
87 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 65.
88 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundae, Q 40 (Benziger Brothers: New York, 1947).
89 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (5th Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 22–23 and Martti 
Koskenniemi, 'Colonization of the “Indies”: The Origin of International Law?' in Yalanda Gamarra (ed.),
La idea de la América en el pensamiento ius internacionalista del siglo XXI (Institución Fernando el 
Católico: Zaragoza, 2010), 43–63 at 43–44
90 Shaw, International Law, supra note 89 at 23.
91 Peter Malanczuk – Michael Akehurst, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 
(7th Revised Edition, Routledge, London, 1997) at 11.
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period of military revolution and of a comprehensive change of the whole paradigm of war
brought on by the proliferation of firearms and ever growing armies.92
The just war reasoning became quite extended and both sides of conflicts were able to
resort to it in justifying their actions. From the 18th century onwards the distinction
between legal and illegal wars faded and the justification of war revolved around the
interests of the state, which were defined by each state themselves.93 During the 19th
century it was the sovereign that rose to the centre and claimed a monopoly on exercising
military power. The legal analysis shifted as well, and it was the sovereign act that became
the starting point of the assessment.94
After the suffering of the First World War, the Covenant of the League of Nations95 (signed
in 1919) set certain limitations on war, although did not ban it altogether. In 1928 the
Kellogg–Briand Pact96 (officially The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War) was
concluded to provide for a more comprehensive prohibition of war. As widely as it was
ratified, it failed to prevent for example the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and, of course, ultimately, the Second World War.
It was not a meaningless treaty, however, and as Ian Brownlie writes, its obligations were
disregarded by some but repudiated by none. And indeed, the Pact also had a role in the
post-war military tribunals.97
3.2 United Nations as the Keeper of International Peace
After the Second World War and the failures of the Kellogg–Briand Pact and the League of
Nations, 51 states in 1945 formed the United Nations (UN), an organization whose
purposes according to Article 1 of the UN Charter include the maintenance of international
peace and security and the development of friendly relations among nations. As the threats
to international peace and security have turned more to intra-state conflicts which the
Charter does not explicitly deal with, the Charter system has evolved through interpretation
92 Joonas Sipilä, 'Puuneista Bastioneihin – Sota ja historialliset esimerkit' in Jyri Raitasalo and Joonas 
Sipilä (eds), Muuttuva sota (National Defence University: Helsinki, 2005), 25–55 at 40–41.
93 Malanczuk – Akehurst, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, supra note 91 at 306–307.
94 Kennedy, Of War and Law, supra note 51 at 61–62.
95 The Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919, in force 10 January 1920.
96 The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 27 August 1928. LNTS vol. XCIV, No. 2137, 33.
97 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1963) at 80.
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and the development of new rules and concepts such as peacekeeping, which has become
an important part of the operation of the United Nations. This process has by no means
been easy nor has there always been a clear consensus on how to apply the existing rules in
new situations.
The maintenance of international peace and security builds around Article 2(4) of the
Charter. It is arguably the most important paragraph of the Charter,98 and it bans member
states from using or threatening to use force against any another state. There are two
exceptions to the prohibition: the use of force authorized by the Security Council and self-
defence under Article 51 of the Charter. In addition to the United Nations Charter,
an important source of rules regarding the use of force is customary international law.
Some of the customary international law rules correspond to those of the UN Charter, but
the relationship between the two is not always clear. Articles 2(4) and 51 and the
corresponding rules of customary international law will be more closely examined later on.
Article 33 along with the rest of Chapter VI of the Charter aims to ensure that states will
settle their disputes peacefully. The Article obliges parties of any dispute whose
continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to
first of all seek a solution by negotiation, mediation or other peaceful means.
The rules of customary international law and the UN Charter apply to states and may only
apply to non-state actors if their actions are attributable to states. The International Law
Commission (ILC) prepared the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts99 (hereafter referred to as Draft Articles on State
Responsibility) whose Chapter II includes rules on the attribution of conduct to a state. In
a subsequent resolution, the General Assembly commended the Draft Articles to the
'attention of governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or other
appropriate action'.100 The question of attribution will be touched upon later, and while
a detailed examination of the issue is outside the scope of this study, suffice it to note at
98 It has for example been called 'the heart of the UN Charter', see Louis Henkin, 'The Reports of the Death
of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated', 65 The American Journal of International Law (1971) 544–
548 at 544. 
99 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN Doc. A/56/10 
(2001).
100 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 12 December 2001. 
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this point that if certain conditions are met, it is entirely possible for the acts of non-state
actors to be attributed to a state in the context of cyber operations as well.
3.3 Interpretation of the Rules of International Law
The United Nations Charter is a central document regarding the rules of jus ad bellum. The
articles of the Charter are, as we shall see on the following pages, not unambiguous and
can, as nearly every treaty text, be interpreted in different ways. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties101 (VCLT), signed in 1969, offers rules and guidance as to the
interpretation of treaties. Article 4 of the VCLT states that the Convention only applies to
treaties concluded after the entry into force of the Convention, which happened in January
1980. However, this does not prevent applying the rules of the VCLT to the UN Charter, as
the rules of the Convention also correspond to customary international law.102
There are three basic approaches to the interpretation of international treaties: one focuses
on the text of the treaty, second on the intention of the adopting parties and the third more
widely on the object and purpose of the treaty.103 The International Court of Justice has
emphasized that the interpretation must primarily be based upon the text of the treaty.104
Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention include features of the three approaches.
According to Article 31 and its general rule of treaty interpretation, the treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. In addition, according to
paragraph 3 of the Article, any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty and any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation shall be taken into
account. In addition to guiding the interpretation, the subsequent practice may also signify
a change in the legal relationship between the parties to the treaty.105
101 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980. 1155 UNTS 331.
102 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1994, p. 6 at para 41. 
Also, Georg Ress, 'Interpretation' in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations – 
A Commentary, Volume I (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002), 13–32 at 18.
103 Shaw, International Law, supra note 89 at 839.
104 Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), supra note 102 at para. 41.
105 Shaw, International Law, supra note 89 at 841.
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Article 32 of the VCLT deals with the supplementary means of interpretation. According to
it, supplementary means such as the preparatory work of the treaty – travaux
préparatoires – can be referred to confirm an ambiguous meaning. Subparagraph b also
states that the supplementary means may be used in interpretation if the result otherwise
comes up manifestly absurd or unreasonable. While useful in some cases, there are also, to
quote Stefan Kadelbach, good reasons to handle the drafting materials with reluctance.106
In other words, the travaux préparatoires may indeed be useful in guiding the
interpretation in some cases, but due consideration must also be given to the development
that has taken place since the San Francisco Conference.
According to a strict view of the Vienna Convention, the reference to the subsequent
practice in Article 31(3)(b) applies to the conduct of states and not to organs of an
organization. Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice has used the practice of
organs as guidance for interpretation. And indeed, the practice of for example the UN
Security Council may, especially in cases of unanimity, be tied back to the member states.
It is true that blindly accepting the practice of organs without due regard for the procedure
behind them may in worst cases lead to the so-called tyranny of the majority, but this may
be avoided by a case-by-case analysis and the acceptance of consistent and widely
accepted practice.107 And in practice soft law instruments are being used for authoritative
interpretation of treaties, also in the context of the use of force.108 Another question is
whether for example the practice of the Security Council is of such uniformity that it
would in this sense count or be useful.
106 Stefan Kadelbach, 'Interpretation of the Charter' in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte 
and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, Volume I (3rd Edition, 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 71–100 at 88–89.
107 Kadelbach, Interpretation of the Charter, supra note 106 at 86–87.
108 Alan Boyle, 'Soft Law in International Law-Making' in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law 
(3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2010), 122–140 at 127–128.
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4 Prohibition of the Use of Force in the Context
of Cyber Operations
4.1 Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states that
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The article does not merely set a prohibition on war, but forbids the 'use of force' and thus
covers a wider set of situations.109 The Article also refers to the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of a state, but these should not, according to
the more common view, be read as a restriction on the scope of the ban.110 In fact, the
smaller states who were behind the insertion meant for it to strengthen, not weaken the
prohibition.111 And indeed, the last part of the sentence includes a catch-all prohibition on
the use or threat of force in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.  
The notion of 'force' is not defined in the Charter, yet it is crucial to the content of the
Article. It is no surprise, then, that there are some varying views on which kind of acts
Article 2(4) covers. The Charter includes a range of terms whose usage is not entirely
unambiguous. As mentioned, Article 2(4) bans the use of 'force' whereas the Preamble of
the Charter speaks about 'armed force' and Article 51 guarantees the right to self-defence in
cases of an 'armed attack'. The definition and content of the terms force and armed attack
shall be examined more closely below. It should also be noted that while Article 2(4) is
a central rule also in the context of cyber operations, it is not the only one. Actions that do
not constitute force may still for example violate the principle of non-intervention or other
109 Shaw, International Law, supra note 89 at 686.
110 Albrecht Randelzhofer, 'Article 2(4)' in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations – 
A Commentary, Volume I (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002), 112–136 at 123–124.
111 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Law and Armed Conflict (Dartmouth Publishing 
Company: Aldershot, 1992) at 25.
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facets of international law. These too will be more closely examined on the following
pages.
4.2 Customary International Law
4.2.1 Prohibition on the Use of Force in Customary
International Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally recognized as
an enumeration of the sources of international law.112 In addition to international treaties, it
also recognizes international custom as a source, and indeed it is an elementary part of
international law. For a norm to be part of customary international law there are two
conditions that have to be met: there has to be settled state practice and a belief of the
existence of an obligation (opinio juris).113 That is, states acting in a certain way in and of
itself is not enough, but the states must believe that there exists a rule that behoves them to
do so.
The prohibition on the use of force is considered to be part of customary international law,
as evidenced by the statements of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case
and the International Law Commission.114 The Court noted that sufficient opinio juris can
be found for example from the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations115 (hereafter referred to as the Friendly Relations Declaration), which
includes the principle of non-use of force. The Court argued that consenting to the text
does not merely reiterate the treaty commitment in the Charter but marks the acceptance of
the validity of the set of rules declared in the resolution. Thus, as the resolution was
adopted without a vote, the member states can be seen as expressing opinio juris.116
112 Hugh Thirlway, 'The Sources of International Law' in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law 
(3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2010), 95–121 at 98.
113 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1969 at para. 77.
114 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Judgment, I. C. J.  Reports 1986 at paras 188–190 and Report of the International Law Commission on 
the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966) at 247.
115 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
116 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para 188.
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While the Court considered the existence of opinio juris in Nicaragua, it did not discuss
the prevalence of force in state behaviour. War has not been eradicated from the world, nor
will it be in the foreseeable future. Does this then mean that the first prerequisite – settled
state practice – of a customary law norm is missing? It bears worth noting that states have
generally attempted to justify their actions in terms of self-defence instead of claiming that
Article 2(4) or a customary law norm with the same content would be invalid.117 Indeed,
these claims and justifications could also be seen as evidence of the expression of opinio
juris by states and thus reinforcing the status of the customary law norm of non-use of
force. And as the ICJ stated in Nicaragua, for a rule to be established as customary, the
practice must not be absolutely conforming but generally consistent with the rule. The
Court also noted that if a state that acts contrary to the rule indeed does appeal to the
exceptions to the rule, the significance of the attitude confirms rather than weakens the
rule, even if the conduct of the state is not in reality justifiable on such basis.118
Another question is the content of the customary international law rule versus the content
of Article 2(4). In Nicaragua, the United States argued that the rule of customary
international rule and Article 2(4) were uniform, but the Court dismissed this
proposition.119 The Court stated that even if customary international law and the Charter
did overlap, they still would maintain their separate identities.120 Yoram Dinstein argues
that the present form of the rule of customary international law is 'essentially a replica' of
Article 2(4), but reminds that it is improbable that the correlation will not develop over the
years.121
The customary law prohibition is, to simplify the issue, potentially more broad in its scope
but evolves more rigidly through state practice and opinio juris. And the prohibition of
Article 2(4) can perhaps be more nimbly interpreted, yet the text of the treaty and the rules
of its interpretation set certain limits. It is thus possible for a rule of customary
international law to emerge regarding specifically cyber operations and the use of force,
but at this point there is not sufficient evidence of such a norm.122 The same can be said
117 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 97.
118 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 186.
119 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 175.
120 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 177.
121 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 100.
122 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on 
a Normative Framework', 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1999) 885–937 at 921–922. 
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with regard to other issues as well, as the question of the evolvement of jus ad bellum is of
course not limited to cyber operations. It has been also claimed that the whole framework
is and has been challenged by developments such as the rise of global terrorism and the
diminishing effect of globalization on the sovereignty of states.123
4.2.2 Prohibition of the Use of Force as a Peremptory Norm
It is clear that the ban on the use of force is part and parcel of customary international law,
but is it also part of jus cogens, a set of unconditional peremptory norms from which no
exceptions are allowed? This is the view of most scholars, and the International Law
Commission has referred to the prohibition of the use of force as a 'conspicuous example'
of a rule that has 'the character of jus cogens'.124 The International Court of Justice referred
to the view of the ILC in Nicaragua125 without explicitly taking the same position, except
for the Separate Opinions of Judges Singh126 and Sette-Camara127. Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a peremptory norm as 'a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character'. This has been generally accepted as the
definition for a peremptory norm.128 Common examples of peremptory norms include the
prohibition of genocide129 and the prohibition of torture,130 but the prohibition of the use of
force has also been widely used as an obvious example of such a norm.131 While a closer
examination of the question is outside the scope of this study, it is worth acknowledging
some of the critique and possible problems regarding outright classifying the wider ban on
the use of force as jus cogens.
123 Sean D. Murphy, 'Protean Jus Ad Bellum', 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009) 22–52 at 23.
124 Report of the ILC, Eighteenth Session, supra note 422 at 247. ILC also referred to such a view in the 
Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 283.
125 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 190.
126 Nicaragua, supra note 114, Separate Opinion of Judge Singh at 153.
127 Nicaragua, supra note 114, Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara at 199. He argues that in addition 
to the prohibition of force also the prohibition of intervention qualifies as a norm of jus cogens.
128 Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law – Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status (Finnish Lawyers' Publishing Company: Helsinki, 1988) at 3.
129 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2006, p. 6 at para. 64.
130 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case no. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment (10 December 1998) at 
para. 153.
131 For an overview of such views, see e.g. Carin Kahgan, 'Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-
Defense', 3 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law (1997), 767–827 at 777–781.
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By definition, peremptory norms allow for no derogation, yet the prohibition of the use of
force as laid out in the Charter of the United Nations includes two uncontested exceptions:
the use of force in self-defence, which is also acknowledged to be part of customary
international law, and the use of force with the authorization of the Security Council. One
common approach is to view the jus cogens prohibition as a wider norm encompassing the
right to self-defence.132 This, however, leads to other problems, such as ambiguity as to the
content of the right to self-defence.133 One of the virtues of the other jus cogens norms is
their clarity: torture is prohibited without exceptions, as is genocide (their definitions can
of course be debated). This is not the case with the ban on the use of force, which includes
somewhat ambiguous exceptions which are in constant evolution, as demonstrated by for
example the emergence of the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) and the discussion
of pre-emptive self-defence. As James A. Green notes, the reality of the development of
jus ad bellum does not fit well into the static and stable nature presumed from a jus cogens
norm.134
A better alternative is to define the jus cogens norm more precisely as a ban of aggression
or aggressive force. This is the approach referred to by the International Law Commission
in the commentary on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility.135 Such an approach has
also been adopted by several scholars, including Lauri Hannikainen in his study on
peremptory norms.136 The Definition of Aggression resolution adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1974 defines aggression as 'the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations'.137
132 For an example of such a formulation, see Ulf Linderfalk, 'The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever 
Opened Pandora's Box, Did You Ever Think About the Consequences?', 18 The European Journal of 
International Law (2008), 853–871 at 860.
133 James A. Green, 'Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force', 
32 Michigan Journal of International Law (2011) 215–257 at 232–236.
134 Green, 'Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force', supra note 133 at 
241.
135 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 283.
136 Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law, supra note 128 at 356. 
137 Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974.
29
4.3 Notion of 'Force'
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter bans the threat or the use of 'force', but there is no explicit
definition of what constitutes force. The International Court of Justice has examined the
notion in the Nicaragua case, and based on the case the possible illegal acts can be divided
into three categories, of which Article 2(4) covers the first two: armed attacks, uses of
force and interventions.138 While the Court did not explicitly define these, the judgment
offers some indication as to what each category comprises. Firstly, the Court drew
a distinction between the 'most grave forms of the use of force', that is armed attacks
referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, and 'other less grave forms'.139 This distinction
represents the prevailing view, but it has been disputed as well.140 The relationship between
Article 2(4) and Article 51 will be further discussed below in chapter 5.2.2 in junction with
the notion of an 'armed attack'. Secondly, the Court drew a distinction between acts
breaching the principle of non-intervention and those constituting a use of force: 'acts
constituting a breach of the customary principle of non-intervention will also, if they
directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-
use of force in international relations'.141 The Court also referred to an operation 'classified
as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident'142 and to the Friendly Relations
Declaration, which posits 'a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force'.
The principle of non-intervention will be summarily discussed in chapter 6.1 below.
While the term 'force' is not preceded by 'armed', it is widely acknowledged that 'force'
refers particularly to armed force and thus excludes for example economic force.143 Some
authors have taken a contrary position and argued that the prohibition is wider and does
indeed include other forms of force as well: for example Hans Kelsen argues that the
notion of force is meant to include any illegal action of a state that violates the interests of
another, not just armed force.144 Even though especially from the viewpoint of poor states
138 McCoubrey and White, International Law and Armed Conflict, supra note 111 at 62.
139 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 191.
140 Albrecht Randelzhofer, 'Article 51' in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations – 
A Commentary, Volume I (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2002), 788–806 at 790–791.
141 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 209.
142 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 195.
143 Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), supra note 110 at 117–118; also Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, 
Universelles Völkerrecht – Theorie und Praxis (3rd Edition, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 1984) at 293.
144 Hans Kelsen, Collective Security Under International Law (U.S. Naval War College: Newport, 1954) at 
55, 57. For an overview of such commentary, see Belatchew Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the UN 
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there might be compelling reasons to treat harsh economic pressure as force, there seems to
be little support available for such an interpretation but instead much stronger arguments
supporting the opposite view.145 Among these is the rejection of a proposal introduced by
Brazil at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 to broaden the ban to include economic
coercion. The issue was also raised during the committee work leading to the Friendly
Relations Declaration, but the view of limiting the notion of force to military force
prevailed and the Declaration refers to measures of economic coercion in the context of the
principle of non-intervention instead of the principle of non-use of force.146 The same kind
of a conclusion was reached with the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness
of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations,147
also known as the Declaration on the Non-Use of Force: it differentiates between armed
interventions (paragraph I, subparagraph 7) and economic or other coercion (paragraph I,
subparagraph 8). It thus seems clear that economic coercion is not covered by Article 2(4),
yet it may still be contrary to international law based on the principle of non-
intervention.148 The question of economic force will be addressed in more detail and in the
context of cyber attacks in chapter 4.5.
Article 2(4) bans the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
The prevailing view is that the language is not intended to restrict the scope of the
prohibition and that it basically covers all uses of force – especially with the catch-all
provision in the end149 – except the ones authorized by the Charter.150 The United Kingdom
argued during the oral proceedings of the Corfu Channel case that the minesweeping
carried out by the Royal Navy in the territorial waters of Albania did not breach Article
2(4) because it was not directed at the territorial integrity or political independence of
Charter – A Study of Art. 2(4) (Iustus Förlag: Uppsala, 1991) at 115–117.
145 For an overview of the argument see e.g. Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), supra note 110 at 118.
146 Asrat, Prohibition of Force Under the UN Charter, supra note 144 at 113–114.
147 Declaration on the  Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or 
Use of Force in International Relations, GA Res. 42/22, 18 November 1987.
148 Derek W. Bowett, 'Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States', 13 The Virginia Journal of 
International Law (1972) 1–12 at 1–2.
149 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 82.
150 Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, supra note 122 at 901.
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Albania.151 The ICJ did not accept this line of reasoning and regarded the claimed right to
intervene as a 'policy of force'.152
Also according to the prevailing view not every act of physical force will be in breach of
the Article as it seeks specifically to ban military force. A popular example of a forceful
non-military act is the opening of the floodgates of a dam, causing severe flooding
downstream. A curious exception to the prevailing view is, however, the use of non-
military force whose effects rise to the level of an armed attack. In such a case a victim
state would be able to act in self-defence based on Article 51. This, however, according to
Albrecht Randelzhofer, would be acceptable only in extreme cases.153 And as with
economic force, even though the acts would not be illegal under Article 2(4), they very
well might be unlawful based on another norm of international law.154
For an act to be considered a use of force, it does not necessarily have to be direct, such as
an attack carried out by the military forces of a state. The International Court of Justice
examined the question in Nicaragua: in the case, the United States argued that it was
acting in collective self-defence following acts of aggression by Nicaragua towards Costa
Rica, El Salvador and Honduras.155 The United States claimed that the Nicaraguan
government had supported armed groups that took military and paramilitary actions against
primarily El Salvador, but on a smaller scale against Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala
as well, and that the Nicaraguan military had engaged in attacks on Honduran and Costa
Rican territory.156 The ICJ declared that the arming and training of the Nicaraguan contras
by the United States did involve the threat or use of force. For this kind of assistance to
constitute a use of force, it has to cross a certain threshold. As the ICJ noted, while the
arming and training of the contras did include use of force, mere supply of funds did not.157
The issue of new types of weapons, namely those that do not involve any explosive effect,
such as bacteriological, biological and chemical weapons, was addressed by Ian Brownlie
151 The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), I. C. J. Pleadings (1950), Volume III. Oral Proceedings, 
Statement by Sir Eric Beckett (U.K.), Sitting of 12 November 1948 at 296.
152 Corfu Channel, supra note 58 at 35.
153 Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), supra note 110 at 118–119.
154 J. N. Singh, Use of Force Under International Law (Harnam Publications: New Delhi, 1984) at 213.
155 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
I. C. J. Pleadings, Volume II, Counter-Memorial of the United States of America at para. 202. 
156 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 128.
157 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 228.
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in 1963. He argued that the use of such non-conventional weapons constitutes use of force
as well, on the basis of two arguments. First, the agents in question were commonly
referred to as weapons and secondly – and more importantly – they are used for the
destruction of life and property.158 The approach follows from a teleological reading of the
UN Charter and the corresponding customary international law rule. According to the
Preamble of the Charter, the aim of the United Nations is to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war. It is thus reasonable to come to the conclusion that the myriad
ways of inflicting death and damage not imaginable during the drafting of the Charter
should be included in the notion of force of Article 2(4), the very article that in effect
carries out the promise of the Preamble.
4.4 Cyber Operations as Force
4.4.1 Overview of Cyber Operations 
The International Court of Justice affirmed in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that
Articles 2(4), 42 and 51 of the UN Charter apply to any use of force, regardless of the
weapons employed.159 It is thus clear that it is entirely possible for a cyber operation to
qualify as a use of force. Such a view is also supported by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, whose Article 31(3)(b) states that any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation shall be taken into account. In their statements several countries have
considered certain cyber attacks to be a type of force.160 This approach has been widely
acknowledged and the contrary claims have mostly been limited to operations with non-
physical consequences which indeed do not qualify as force.161 Because cyber operations
are a group of very divergent actions, sweeping claims that would bring all such acts under
the notion of force are excessive and not justifiable and thus rare. Determining exact and
absolute rules for which kinds of cyber operations do constitute force is impossible. The
following pages aim to draw some conclusions as to what kind of actions might cross the
threshold.
158 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, supra note 97 at 362.
159 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29 at para 39. For an example of such a view in earlier literature see e.g. 
Singh, Use of Force Under International Law, supra note 154 at 213.
160 For an overview of such statements, see Roscini, World Wide Warfare, supra note 17 at 108–109. 
161 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 46–47.
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It has also been argued that the interpretative methods of the VCLT do not allow for the
inclusion of cyber force to the ambit of Article 2(4).162 Such claims are not convincing, for
they view cyber force as not a type of armed force but a new type of force of its own. As
mentioned, sweeping claims of either inclusion or exclusion regarding the notion of force
are too broad. While it is true that for example the aforementioned possible severe
economic consequences of a cyber operation may pose challenges for the exclusion of
economic force from the prohibition of Article 2(4), certain types of cyber operations do
without a doubt fit into the notion of armed force.
It is worth emphasizing the distinction of lex lata, the law as it currently exists and lex
ferenda, the possible law in the future. It is entirely reasonable to claim de lege ferenda that
for example an attack with only economic consequences could in the future be viewed by
states as a use of force and thus the interpretation of Article 2(4) or the customary
international law rule prohibiting the use of force could be expanded to include such
attacks. It is a completely different statement to claim such an interpretation to be
representative of lex lata. It has also been suggested that the distinction might not always
be appropriate when discussing cyber operations on the basis that a de lege ferenda
argument can only be presented if it differs from the existing law. The discussions
regarding cyber operations mostly are, however, about applying the current law in
cyberspace.163
4.4.2 Some Unique Characteristics of Cyber Operations
The International Court of Justice noted in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that
taking into account the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons was imperative in
applying the Charter law to the case at hand.164 Accordingly, the unique characteristics of
cyber operations must be taken into account when applying the jus ad bellum to them.
There are several ways of describing and categorizing these characteristics, and Heather
Harrison Dinniss provides one example. She identifies four characteristics of cyber
operations that distinguish them from conventional attacks in terms of the framework of
162 Marco Benatar, 'The Use of Cyber Force: Need for Legal Justification?' in 1 Goettingen Journal of 
International Law (2009) 375–396 at 392.
163 Ziolkowski, Ius ad bellum in Cyberspace – Some Thoughts on the 'Schmitt-Criteria' for Use of Force, 
supra note 12 at 309.
164 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29 at para. 36.
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the use of force: indirectness, intangibility, locus and result.165 Some of the issues have
already been touched upon and some will be discussed in further detail later. What follows
is a summary of the issues based on the four distinguishing characteristics before turning to
the question of when cyber operations qualify as uses of force.
Indirectness is indeed one potentially distinguishing factor: several types of cyber
operations require further action by a second actor after the initial act. Examples of such
include an attack on the targeting system of a missile, or disabling air traffic control
systems.166 Direct cyber attacks are possible as well. One example is the breach of a control
system of a dam and the opening of floodgates. The ICJ stated in Nicaragua that also
indirect acts, such as support of a certain type for terrorist activities, may constitute uses of
force.167 Thus, the possible indirectness of a cyber attack seems not to be a prohibitive
factor in applying the current law if there is a sufficient causal nexus between the attack
and the destructive effect.
The intangibility factor refers to the fact that neither the target of the attack nor the weapon
used might not exist in a physical level. The damage might be intangible as well, as in the
case of an attack on a stock exchange.168 Even attacks that ultimately result in physical
consequences target the information resident in computers. For example the Stuxnet attack
modified the spinning frequencies of the centrifuges, which directly resulted in physical
damage to them.169 More difficult are the cases where the target is the destruction or
altering of the information itself. Such attacks, too, might lead to physical consequences,
but with a less direct nexus.170 
The locus factor takes into consideration the fact that in some cases it may be difficult to
ascertain the origin of the attack.171 The attack may be routed through several points in
different countries in order to hide the true source, or the malicious traffic may come from
165 Heather Harrison Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
at 65.
166 Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra note 165 at 65–66.
167 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at paras 195, 205, 228.
168 Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra note 165 at 67.
169 Erik Chien, 'Stuxnet: A Breakthrough', Symantec Blog, 12 November 2010, 
<www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-breakthrough>.
170 Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra note 165 at 67–68.
171 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited', 56 Villanova Law Review 
(2011) 569–605 at 594. 
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several countries. During the attacks on Estonia in 2007 the traffic originated from 178
countries.172 It should be noted, though, that the attacks were distributed denial-of-service
attacks which by definition originate from countless sources. Nevertheless, the incident
provides an example of how difficult it may be to trace the attack back to the real origin, at
least in a timely manner.
As has already been discussed, the results of cyber operations cover a wide range of
consequences spanning from mere inconvenience to physical destruction. The
indeterminacy and variety of the results spanning from inconvenience to physical
destruction is arguably the most challenging factor in categorizing in applying the rules on
the use of force to cyber attacks.173 The results might in some cases also be more
unpredictable than in the case of kinetic force. A common example of such a case is a
cyber attack on a stock exchange or a bank.174
4.4.3 Cyber Operations as Uses of Force
The proposals for solving the question of cyber operations and the threshold of force may
be divided to three main approaches: effects-based, target-based, and instrument-based.
The instrument-based approach uses the weapon used as the determining factor: a cyber
operation may qualify as force if the weapon used sufficiently resembles the
conventionally used ones. The target-based approach treats any operation targeting critical
infrastructure as an armed attack (and thus, also, as force). The effects-based approach uses
the overall effects of the operation as the determining factor.175 None of these approaches is
without issues,176 but the most prevalent of the approaches seems to be the effects-based
one, also adopted by the Tallinn Manual.177 The Manual refers to the 'scale and effects'
assessment used by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua. The ICJ stated that the
172 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, supra note 60 at 23.
173 Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, supra note 122 at 912. 
Heather Harrison Dinniss takes a similar view. Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra 
note 165 at 72–73.
174 See infra at 43.
175 Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, supra note 38 at 1041.
176 Reese Nguyen, 'Navigating Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Cyber Warfare', 101 California Law Review 
(2013) 1079–1131 at 1117–1124.
177 See e.g. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force under Article 2(4), supra note 36 at 84–85, 
Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 36 at 847, Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws 
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sending of armed bands by a state to another state may classify as an armed attack if the
scale and effects of the attack are such that it would have constituted an armed attack if it
were carried out by regular armed forces.178 The ICJ mentioned the scale and effects of the
attack with regard to the threshold of an armed attack, but the Tallinn Manual finds it to be
equally useful in determining whether an operation constitutes force.179
Effects-based Approach
The group behind the Tallinn Manual agreed that 'acts that injure or kill persons or damage
or destroy objects are unambiguously uses of force'. Towards the other end of the
spectrum, the Manual states that non-destructive, psychological cyber operations intended
solely to undermine confidence in a government or economy do not qualify as uses of
force.180 As regards other, more ambiguous cases, the Manual non-exhaustively lists eight
factors which are considered to be influential when states assess whether a cyber operation
constitutes a use of force.181 These criteria are severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness
measurability of effects, military character, state involvement and presumptive legality.
They are based on the ones suggested by Michael Schmitt first in 1999 and are not,
according to the Manual, meant as legal criteria.182 Neither are the criteria meant to give a
binary answer to whether or not a certain act qualifies as force, and such a claim would of
course be overreaching. The criteria do, however, make it possible to examine an operation
on a sliding scale. Such an approach is justified. Exact rules and their automatic application
is, as noted by Martti Koskenniemi, problematic because of their over- and under-
inclusiveness.183 The extreme variety of possible cyber operations and the uncertainty
regarding the whole field emphasizes this point even further.
The Tallinn Manual expressly states that the presented criteria are meant to be factors
influencing the use of force assessments by states and not legal criteria.184 This is a bit
more hesitant view than the one presented by Schmitt in his earlier article in 1999 and it
178 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 195.
179 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 45–46.
180 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 46–48.
181 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 47–51.
182 Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law, supra note 122
at 914–915.
183 Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest too Much' – Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law', 65 The Modern Law Review (2002) 159–175 at 167.
184 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 48.
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has been the target of some critique.185 Schmitt himself noted that his approach is
influenced by the New Haven School and its policy-oriented view.186 While the criteria of
the Tallinn Manual – sometimes also referred to as the Schmitt criteria – do offer a basis
for the evaluation of an operation, the determination seems to in many cases boil down to
the severity criterion and a seemingly simple result: if a cyber operation produces physical
damage to persons or property comparable to that produced by a kinetic attack, the
operation counts as force.187 Katharina Ziolkowski approaches the issue from a similar
viewpoint and argues that there is no need for special criteria beyond focusing on the
effects.188 What kind of physical damage suffices, is, of course, another question. The
Tallinn Manual notes that the severity criterion is subject to a de minimis rule.189 Such a
rule should indeed be applied in the determination as cyber attacks are also capable of
causing negligible physical damage, such as damage to a hard drive of a single computer
which should not by itself count as a use of force.
One problem with the Tallinn Manual criteria is related to their ambiguity and malleability,
which has also been acknowledged by Michael Schmitt.190 They have been used to argue
that the 2007 attacks on Estonia reached the threshold of force.191 The argument is,
however, not convincing without subscribing to the view that the notion of force includes
economic force – and even then it could be asked whether or not the attacks caused so
much economic damage as to constitute force. The same criteria can, more convincingly,
also be used to argue that the attacks did in fact not constitute a use of force.192 The wide-
ranging criteria allow for broad interpretation to whichever direction wanted.193 Then
185 See e.g. Ziolkowski, Ius ad bellum in Cyberspace – Some Thoughts on the 'Schmitt-Criteria' for Use of 
Force, supra note 12 at 308–309 and Lianne J. M. Boer, '”Restating the Law 'As It Is'”: On the Tallinn 
Manual and the Use of Force in Cyberspace', 5 Amsterdam Law Forum (2013) 4–18 at 13–17. Boer's 
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claim that every assertion in the Manual represents an incontrovertible restatement of international law 
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again, the criteria are, as stated in the Tallinn Manual, meant as factors that influence the
assessments of states instead of purely legal criteria.194
Article 41 of the Charter states that the Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of force may be employed, and that these may include interruption of
economic relations and of postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication.
Thus, on the basis of such formulation it can be surmised that the mere interruption of
communication would not constitute a use of force. This supports the determination
following from the effects-based view that for example denial-of-service attacks do not
constitute uses of force.
Target-based Approach
The target-based approach expands the notion of force to be needlessly extensive. It would
considerably lower the threshold of the use of force and risk escalating responses. Walter
Gary Sharp, Sr. argues that the mere penetration by a state to critical computer systems
which are important to the ability of a state to defend itself would demonstrate such hostile
intent that it would justify the use of force in self-defence.195 Such a view, however, is not
reasonable. Gaining unauthorized access to a computer system may well be a criminal
offence for an individual, but it does not by itself constitute a use of force even in the case
of a critical system. Eric Talbot Jensen argues that the traditional framework on the use of
force and self-defence does not offer sufficient protection from potential threats.196 He
claims that international law should evolve to recognize an inherent right of a state to self-
defence against a computer network attack on critical national infrastructure, even if the
attack does not amount to an armed attack in light of Article 51 of the UN Charter.197
Jensen also argues that 'the requirement to attribute an attack before responding presents a
significant gap in a nation's ability to defend itself'. According to him, the target of the
attack should be a determining factor in justifying an active response 'regardless of the
attacker's identity'.198 This, then would mean that states would be able to respond by
194 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 48.
195 Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Cyberspace and the Use of Force (Aegis Research Corporation: Falls Church, 
1999) at 129–130.
196 Eric Talbot Jensen, 'Computer Network Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force 
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense', 38 Stanford Journal of International Law (2002) 207–240 at 221.
197 Jensen, Computer Network Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure, supra note 196 at 229.
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military force to attacks on certain targets without even determining the true source of the
attack. Such a claim is insupportable and would even in practice bring about
insurmountable difficulties: the attack may be routed through a neutral and an innocent
country, or even through a computer in the same country as the target. His approach
certainly takes into account the unique characteristics and challenges of cyber operations,
but does not sufficiently consider the possibilities and dangers of escalation, even taking
into account his view of the response being proportionate. Neither does it consider the
possible problem of taking action against a state whose network was merely used as a
vehicle for the delivery of the attack. Attribution must not be seen as an obstacle199 but an
unconditional requirement of a lawful response.
Instrument-based Approach
Applying the instrument-based model to cyber operations is problematic as well. Cyber
attacks might well have severe consequences without using traditional military weapons
which has been seen as the defining factor in the approach.200 It would thus be difficult to
fit cyber attacks into the framework. The possible consequences of cyber attacks vary a
great deal, from inconvenience to physical destruction.201 Grouping cyber attacks together
and analogizing them to military weapons would be, because of the varying consequences,
difficult if not impossible. Dividing the possible attacks into smaller, more detailed groups
such as cyber attacks with physical consequences would effectively mean applying the
effects-based model first.
4.4.4 Attempts and Unsuccessful Attacks
Another question is that of unsuccessful attacks and how they fit into the framework so
focused on the effects of the attacks. The issue is somewhat different with cyber operations
compared to conventional kinetic attacks: a missile or a bomb might miss its target, but it
will nevertheless cause physical consequences. A failed cyber operation, however, might
not cause any kind of physical consequences – in fact, it might very well go unnoticed
altogether. While it is true that a purely effects-based rule would be under-inclusive in this
sense and would not necessarily do much to deter attack attempts, there seems to currently
199 Jensen, Computer Network Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure, supra note 196 at 239–240.
200 Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 36 at 846.
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be little support for counting unsuccessful attacks without any kind of physical
consequences as uses of force.
A similar question can be raised regarding attacks that have been spotted and successfully
foiled by the target of the attempted attack. A hypothetical situation can be drawn up to
illustrate the issue: an attacker has successfully taken advantage of a vulnerability and
placed a piece of malicious software on the computer network of a nuclear power plant.
The attacker has not yet activated the malware and everything at the power plant is running
normally. Then, the breach is discovered, the malware found, disabled and removed from
the system. Subsequent analysis shows that the malware was capable of tampering with the
cooling processes of the power plant in such a way that would have purportedly resulted in
a meltdown and a major accident and significant loss of life. Furthermore, by reverse
engineering the malware the breach and the placement of the malware can with reasonable
confidence be attributed to a hostile state. Again, there has been no physical consequences
but an act without a clear equivalent in the world of conventional kinetic attacks. It could
reasonably be argued that the mere placement of the malware does not constitute a use of
force and an attack had not yet taken place. In this sense, the breach might be likened to an
airspace violation or, depending on the gravity of the possible consequences, perhaps to
locking a missile on an enemy aircraft. The situation can be complicated more by
hypothesizing that the malware was written in a way that it would have activated without
an external command from the attacker, for example on a certain time and date. In such
a case it could well be argued that an attack has already taken place, although it is less clear
whether or not there would be support for such argumentation. Both instances could also
be described as breaches of the principle of non-intervention, more closely examined later
on. It is easy to imagine, though, that the victim state, especially in the latter case, would
react in a more fierce way than the strict limitations of countermeasures would allow.
4.4.5 Cyber Assistance as Force
The question of the possibility of assistance counting as a use of force is especially
relevant to cyber operations. There are several ways how a state may offer assistance to
another state or a non-state actor in preparing a cyber attack. It might provide them
knowledge about a zero-day vulnerability (or several of them), it might provide them more
specific information about how to take advantage of said vulnerabilities or it might provide
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them with a ready-made piece of software. Or, it might provide them information about the
targeted system and how to achieve the intended consequences once they have gained
access. The Tallinn Manual states, following the position of the International Court of
Justice, that mere funding of for example a hacktivist group who conducts cyber operations
does not constitute a use of force. Providing an organized group with malware and the
training necessary to use it to carry out attacks would, however, qualify as a use of force.202
This leads to the question of what kind of malware suffices? The malware might, for
example allow for the attacker to gain access to a system. Such access could, theoretically
and depending on the target, be used for either espionage or conducting an attack. Merely
providing access to a system would not, in my view, constitute a use of force, even though
access to the system is of course a central element of the attack. On the other hand,
providing a malware that would not merely be an enabling factor but would in essence
form the crux of the attack would more probably constitute a use of force, depending on
the circumstances.
Whereas the provision of traditional weapons and training undoubtedly benefits the
recipient and may even be the sine qua non of an operation, there still remains much to be
done to carry out the proper operation. Cyber operations may, however, be considerably
different in this sense. That is, the actual execution of the attack is a much smaller part of
the whole operation when compared for example the paramilitary operations discussed in
the Nicaragua case. In an extreme example, the assisting state may provide a complete
attack package which merely needs to be executed.
4.5 Economic or Political Force
The prevailing view is that the ban of force in Article 2(4) does not cover economic or
political force. One of the new threats brought along by cyber attacks is the possibility to
cause potentially catastrophic economic consequences without any physical damage. An
example of such would be a widespread attack on the banking system or a stock exchange
that could topple the economy of a country, as well as cause cross-border ripple effects.
Granted, the example is a rather extreme one, yet it helps to underline how cyber
202 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 46.
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operations might affect and cause problems for the previously more clear distinction
between physical and economic force.
Some of the views and argumentation advocating the inclusion of economic force into the
ambit of Article 2(4) seem to often place unduly emphasis on the part of Article 2(4) that
considers the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state. An example of such a view is the one of Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., who sees Article
2(4) as covering acts starting from coercive political and economic sanctions that threaten
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.203 While the text of Article 2(4)
surely enables such a reading, it is not supported by the travaux préparatoires, the
Preamble of the UN Charter, the Friendly Relations Declaration or the Definition of
Aggression Resolution, all of which point to interpreting Article 2(4) as banning the use of
armed force.204 
While they indisputably do not qualify as a use of force, the events of 23 April 2013 do
provide an example of how susceptible to a variety of attacks the economy is. A group
calling themselves the Syrian Electronic Army (aligned with the al-Assad regime) hacked
the Twitter account of the news agency AP and posted a tweet claiming there had been an
explosion at the White House and that president Obama had been injured.205 In the minutes
that followed the tweet, the Dow Jones index plummeted over 140 points equalling almost
140 billion dollars. As it became clear that no explosion had happened, the Dow bounced
back in a matter of minutes. Another example of the fickleness of the global financial
system is the reportedly planned cyber operation by the United States against Iraqi banks in
preparation of the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom.206 According to news reports, the U.S.
had a plan to effectively freeze Saddam Hussein's funds by launching a cyber attack on
Iraqi banks, but the plan was scrapped because it was feared that unpredictable
consequences would spread around the globe in the highly networked banking system.
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It remains to be seen whether or not the emergence of cyber operations with possible
severe economic consequences affects the debate about economic force. As Grigorij
Tunkin writes, the use of economic force may represent a considerable threat to the
political independence of states and to the stability of international relations.207 Cyber
operations pose new opportunities for the realization of such a threat. This may very well
call for a reappraisal of the scope of the notion of force, or alternatively of the possibilities
of states to react to breaches of the principle of non-intervention. Many commentators
focus on the textual reading of the Charter when arguing that Article 2(4) covers only
armed force and note that the Preamble of the Charter speaks of 'armed force' and that
Article 44 supports such a view as well.208 While it is true that such evidence is hard to
pass, somewhat less notice has been paid to the customary international law rule banning
the use of force. As mentioned, the prohibition is also part of customary international
law,209 and as such subject to modification. As the ICJ noted in Nicaragua, the reliance by
a state on a novel right may tend towards a modification of customary international law if
shared by other states.210 There is no evidence of such state practice at the moment, but just
as the events after the 9/11 terrorist attacks arguably lowered the standard for attribution to
state from the levels set forth by the ICJ in Nicaragua or by the ICTY in Tadić rather
swiftly,211 a cyber attack with extreme economic consequences might very well have a
similar effect to state practice. Such a hypothesis is, of course, at this point pure
speculation. It is clear, however, that cyber operations are capable of pure economic
consequences unachievable by other types of attacks.212 Thus, analogizing cyber operations
with traditional economic pressure is not necessarily a satisfactory approach.
4.6 Chapter VII of the UN Charter
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter sets a framework for the legitimate use of force
under the authorization of the Security Council. Article 39 gives the Security Council the
power to 'determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of
aggression' and the power to decide what responsive measures are in order to maintain
207 Grigorij Ivanovič Tunkin, Recht und Gewalt im internationalen System (Duncker & Humblot: Berlin 
1986) at 62.
208 Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), supra note 110 at 118.
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international peace and security. The variety of measures range in practice from economic
sanctions and no-fly zones to authorizing the use of force against a UN member state.
When using Chapter VII as a legal basis for actions, the Security Council has previously
shown a clear preference to referring generally to Chapter VII rather than to specific
articles.213 More recently, however, the Security Council has also referred to specific
articles after the controversy regarding the concept of revived or implied authorization
used by the USA and the UK in Iraq (both after the first Gulf War and in 2003) and
Kosovo.214 To avoid any possibility for using the potentially ambiguous references in the
resolutions to constitute a justification for the use of force, specific references were made
in resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006) regarding North Korea and resolution 1696
(2006) regarding Iran. The Security Council has also preferred to use a 'threat to peace' as
the basis of its actions instead of a 'breach of peace' or an 'act of aggression'215 and avoided
pointing out the offenders.216
The Charter gives the Security Council the power to determine which actions it deems fit
for a particular situation, so it is possible for it to authorize cyber operations as well. This
might be done either specifically or, as seems more likely, as part of 'all necessary
measures' to implement a resolution.217 Article 41 empowers the Security Council to take
non-forceful measures such as interruption of economic relations or means of
communication and if such measures are inadequate, the Security Council may authorize
forceful measures pursuant to Article 42. Thus far the Security Council has shied away
from restricting communications because of the possibly ensuing human rights issues,218
but cyber operations might theoretically offer a way to target military communications
more specifically. Originally it was envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter that member
countries would make armed forces available to the Security Council based on separate
agreements. Article 43 has never completely been implemented and in the cases where the
Security Council has authorized the use of force the operations have been carried out by
213 Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (Manchester University 
Press, 2005) at 7.
214 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 366.
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coalitions of the willing.219 Were the Security Council to authorize cyber operations, it is
imaginable that they would be carried out in a similar fashion.
Article 39 gives the Security Council the power to determine the existence of a threat to or
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. It thus may determine that a cyber operation
would qualify for such an act, even if it would not be sufficiently grave as to justify self-
defence based on Article 51 or breach Article 2(4). The Tallinn Manual suggests that in
addition to in specific cases identifying cyber operations belonging to the purview of
Article 39 it could declare certain cyber operations (for example those targeting critical
national infrastructure) as threats to or breaches of the peace or acts of aggression in
abstracto similarly to international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.220 This, of
course, is entirely possible, especially should a disrupting attack take place or an inability
to conclude a multilateral treaty transpire. However, it does not seem likely: defining
which kinds of operations and targets would suffice would present considerable
difficulties.
219 Jochen Frowein and Nico Krisch, 'Article 43' in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations 
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5 Cyber Operations as Armed Attacks and
the Right to Self-Defence
5.1 Overview of the Right to Self-Defence
After the freedom to wage war became more limited in the beginning of the 20th century
the legal justifications for going to war became more significant. The idea of self-defence
as a justification for the use of force was by no means a new development: it had indeed
been used previously as a justification as well, but for political purposes.221 The right to
self-defence is considered to be a part of customary international law,222 and it is included
in the UN Charter, whose Article 51 states that
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
The Article can be interpreted in various ways which will more closely be examined in the
following pages. The most pressing question is what is considered to be an armed attack
that triggers the right to self-defence. As with the previously discussed notion of force,
there is no explicit and agreed upon definition but some positions by the International
Court of Justice and a plethora of scholarly opinions. The Court stated in Nicaragua that
just as Articles 2(4) and 42 of the UN Charter, also Article 51 does not refer to specific
weapons.223 It thus follows that they also apply to cyber operations as well and that a state
has the right to use force in self-defence if it is a victim of a cyber attack that rises to the
level of an armed attack. And correspondingly, a state may use cyber operations when
acting in self-defence in response to an armed attack regardless of the weapons used in the
attack against it.   
221 Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note 140 at 789.
222 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 176. For a similar view of self-preservation as grounds for the use of 
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As mentioned, the right to self-defence is also part of customary international law. The ICJ
stated in Nicaragua that customary international law continues to co-exist with treaty law,
and the rules do not have exactly the same content.224 This, of course, begs the question of
how does the right to self-defence based on customary international law differ from the
right guaranteed in Article 51. This will be discussed especially in the context of
anticipatory self-defence in chapter 5.5.
Another essential issue involves the content and limitations of the right to self-defence.
These stem from the Caroline affair of 1837, which has since gained a somewhat mythical
status in the field of international law. In the correspondence between United States
Secretary of State Daniel Webster and the British authorities after the incident, Webster
wrote that the British government must show 'a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation'.225 There is
some ambiguity as to whether the incident is a useful and generally applicable precedent,
as it originally related to cases of anticipatory self-defence.226 However, the requirements
of necessity and proportionality have been affirmed by the International Court of Justice in
several cases and there remains little controversy about the existence of such requirements
in customary international law.227 The more detailed content of the requirements and their
application in specific cases is however far from uncontroversial. It is agreed, though, that
the purpose of self-defence must be to stop and repel an attack and not retaliate.228 The ICJ
usually applies the requirements separately,229 yet they are clearly linked. Providing a
comprehensive definition for a proportionate attack is impossible: the facts and context of
a particular case influence the answer.230 
While states do have differing interpretations on which acts justify self-defence and the
content of the right, they nevertheless usually rely on self-defence as the legal justification
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for their actions,231 even though they might at the same time push the boundaries of the
right to a breaking point. An example of the contrary are the military actions of Turkey
against Iraq, especially after the first Gulf War in the 1990s when Turkish forces carried
out operations against Kurds on Iraqi territory. Turkey never explicitly invoked the right to
self-defence but instead justified its operations on the basis that Iraq could not prevent
using its territory for 'staging terrorist acts against Turkey', and thus the 'legitimate' acts of
Turkey did not violate the sovereignty of Iraq.232 Later, Turkey referred to the Friendly
Relations Declaration and to the principle of necessity.233 Iran, while conducting similar
operations in Iraqi territory, invoked Article 51 and notified the Security Council that it
was acting in self-defence.234 Turkey carried out military operations in 2006 and 2007
against the Kurdish group PKK, but did not offer any legal justification for its use of force
in this case and did not report the operations to the Security Council.235
Article 51 preserves the right to individual or collective self-defence. The consensus is that
collective self-defence does not require any pre-existing arrangement, such as a regional
treaty or a bilateral assistance treaty.236 In other words, ad hoc assistance of another state is
possible. That said, the victim state of the attack must still declare that it has been the target
of an armed attack.237 In other words, a third state may not unpromptedly, solely based on
its own assessment, act in self-defence of the victim state. The ICJ discussed the issue in
Nicaragua regarding the claim presented by the United States that it was acting in self-
defence on behalf of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. The Court stated that
Honduras and Costa Rica did not make any references to collective self-defence and that El
Salvador asked for the United States to exercise the right to collective self-defence only on
231 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 97, see also McCoubrey and White, 
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a much later date.238 This led the Court to conclude that the condition sine qua non for the
exercise of collective self-defence was not fulfilled.239
5.2 Notion of an 'Armed Attack'
As discussed in chapter 4.3, the illegal acts of states relating to the topic at hand may be
divided to three categories: interventions, uses of force and armed attacks.240 As is the case
with Article 2(4) and the term 'force', the UN Charter does not explicitly define the term
'armed attack' either. The relation of the two terms has also been the subject of some debate
and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 5.2.2.
A traditional case and a clear example of an armed attack is a sufficiently grave attack
(with significant damage, including fatalities) carried out by the armed forces of a state.
Such is indisputably an armed attack to which a state may respond forcibly with the
justification of Article 51 of the UN Charter as well as the 'inherent right' to self-defence.
But what about cases where the attack and its consequences are less grave? Or where the
attack is carried out by non-state forces? These issues have been heatedly discussed, and
after the 9/11 attacks the much of the debate has concerned the possibility of self-defence
against terrorist attacks. The questions are also relevant to the discussion about cyber
operations, since the consequences of such operations are varied and do not in most cases
clearly cross the threshold of an armed attack. Cyber operations can also easily be carried
out by non-state actors, either with or without the support of a state.
The International Court of Justice has contemplated the notion of an armed attack in
several cases, and while the exact limits of the notion remain elusive, some guidance can
be mustered by examining the relatively clear cases. The Court first examined the issue in
the Nicaragua case, which was summarily described earlier with regard to the notion of
force.241 The majority of the ICJ found that even though the assistance to the contras could
be regarded as a threat or use of force or an intervention, it did not constitute an armed
attack that would have justified collective self-defence,242 which was what the United
238 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at paras 233–234.
239 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 237.
240 McCoubrey and White, International Law and Armed Conflict, supra note 111 at 62.
241 Supra at 32.
242 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 195.
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States claimed.243 In discussing the matter, the Court also distinguished 'mere frontier
incidents' from armed attacks.244 It is also noteworthy that the ICJ stated that it did not have
enough information available about the circumstances and the possible motivations of the
incursions into the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica.245 This has been taken to imply
that the Court would find the circumstances and motivations relevant for the determination
of whether the operation would be classified as a frontier incident or an armed attack.246
Another significant case is Oil Platforms, where the Court considered another claim of
self-defence by the United States in response to alleged attacks by Iran on U.S.-flagged
ships during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s. Two incidents were at the centre of the case
brought by Iran. First, in October 1987 the Sea Isle City, a Kuwaiti tanker sailing under the
U.S. flag at the time was hit by a missile near Kuwait.247 The ship was damaged and six
crew members were injured.248 The United States responded by attacking Iranian offshore
oil production facilities. Six months later, a U.S. navy frigate, the Samuel B. Roberts,
struck a mine near Bahrain, and the United States again responded by attacking two oil
production complexes.249 Regarding the Sea Isle City attack, the Court found that the
evidence indicating the responsibility of Iran was not sufficient.250 The Court also noted
that the missile could not have been specifically aimed at a certain ship. The United States
also named other attacks in the preceding months and asserted that the attack on the Sea
Isle City was only the latest in a series of attacks, but the Court dismissed these claims for
various reasons and stated that even setting aside the question of Iranian responsibility, the
incidents did not constitute an armed attack on the United States.251 As regards the Samuel
B. Roberts attack, the Court again dismissed the U.S. claim of self-defence due to the
circumstances, including the inconclusive evidence of the responsibility of Iran. In
discussing the attack, the Court stated that it did not exclude the possibility of an attack on
a single military vessel constituting an armed attack.252
243 Nicaragua, Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 155 at para. 202. 
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Generally the International Court of Justice has taken a cautious view and steered clear of
the most controversial issues where possible.253 It did so for example in the Armed
Activities case where it first found that there was not enough evidence to attribute the
activities of the rebel group ADF to the Republic of Congo and then explicitly stated that
because of this, there is no need for the Court to examine whether states may invoke the
right to self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces.254
The issue of what constitutes an armed attack was also touched upon by the
Eritrea/Ethiopia Claims Commission. It briefly noted that 'localized border encounters',
even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute armed attacks.255 It thus followed the
reasoning of the International Court of Justice and the distinction it made in Nicaragua
separating armed attacks and 'mere frontier incidents'.256
5.2.1 Accumulation of Events
Small-scale attacks and incursions have been considered in light of a theory of
accumulation of events, also sometimes called the pin prick theory. States have claimed to
have responded to a series of attacks that collectively have amounted to an armed attack,
even though each individual attack considered separately has not crossed the threshold.257
The International Court of Justice has referred to the possibility of acts collectively
amounting to an armed attack in its judgments without taking a definite position on the
matter.
In Nicaragua, the ICJ stated that the lack of information made it difficult to decide whether
or not the separate smaller incidents 'singly or collectively' amounted to an armed attack.258
In other words, the Court implied that such a possibility indeed existed. In the Oil
Platforms case the United States asserted both before the ICJ and in its letters to the
Security Council that it was responding not merely to the attack on the Sea Isle City and
the Samuel B. Roberts but to a series of such attacks.259 While the Court did state that the
253 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, supra note 214 at 129.
254 Armed Activities, supra note 227 at para. 147.
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Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 19 December 2005 at para. 11.
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incidents in question did not amount to an armed attack because of other reasons (for
example, the Sea Isle City could not have been specifically targeted, and another ship, the
Texaco Caribbean was not sailing under a U.S. but a Panamanian flag), it implied that
certain acts, taken cumulatively, could constitute an armed attack.260 In the Armed
Activities case the Court again could be seen as insinuating to the direction of such a
possibility, although less explicitly than in Nicaragua and Oil Platforms.261 The Court
stated that even if the 'series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in
character', they were not attributable to the Republic of Congo. The question of cumulative
attacks was at issue in the Cameroon v. Nigeria case as well, but the Court concluded that
Cameroon had not sufficiently shown that the acts in question were imputable to Nigeria
and thus avoided ruling on the issue of whether the separate acts taken as a whole
constituted an armed attack.262
It is thus conceivable that a series of pin-prick attacks could be collectively seen as an
armed attack if the attacks are sufficiently related and the consequences sufficiently grave.
The same logic applies to cyber operations as well. In other words, a series of related cyber
attacks by the same actor may be considered as a 'composite armed attack'.263 An example
might be a cyber attack on the electricity grid: attacking an individual transformer or even
a power plant might cause physical damage that would constitute force but might not be
sufficiently grave as to be an armed attack. However, a series of similar attacks carried out
simultaneously on several transformers or power plants might very well collectively cross
the threshold of an armed attack.
5.2.2 Notions of Armed Attacks and Force
According to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states shall refrain from the threat or use of
force and Article 51 gives states the right to defend themselves if an 'armed attack' occurs.
The International Court of Justice has described armed attacks as the most grave forms of
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/19219 and Letter Dated 18 April 1988 from the Acting 
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the use of force in Nicaragua,264 and has since reaffirmed its position in Oil Platforms.265 It
thus seems clear that not all uses of force trigger the right to self-defence. This distinction
has been challenged as well, and some commentators note it is not fully supported by state
practice. They argue that states generally do not tolerate hostile military activity and
reserve the right to counter such activities even if they do not amount to a grave use of
force.266 Among the critics is the former U.S. State Department Legal Advisor William H.
Taft, who argues that the separation of the two notions would encourage states to engage in
a series of smaller attacks to avoid responsibility.267 Christine Gray, for example, considers
this argument to be implausible and notes the lack of such practice since the case.268
Tarcisio Gazzini argues that setting a higher threshold for the right to self-defence would
expose states to 'unacceptable risks' and notes that the limits set by the requirements of
immediacy, proportionality and necessity do provide an adequate safeguard against the
abuse of the right to self-defence.269 While the legal status of responding forcibly to all uses
of force is not clear, it should also be noted that states most likely may rely on the response
being accepted if it was proportional to the original attack.270
In a separate opinion to the Oil Platforms judgment, Judge Simma reaffirms a sort of an
intermediate position taken earlier in a 1984 book. He submits that there are indeed two
levels of acts: the level of armed attacks in the sense of Article 51 and a lower level of
hostile military action (he avoids using using the term 'force'). According to his view, a
state may defend itself against the lower level actions as well, but 'within a more limited
range and quality of responses'. Such acts do not justify collective self-defence and are 'in a
particularly strict way' subject to the requirements of necessity and proportionality.271 Such
a view indeed would resolve some of the practical problems ensuing from the separation of
thresholds of an use of force and an armed attack and would be in line with state practice
264 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 191.
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of not tolerating even smaller scale operations. States regularly have invoked the right to
self-defence when resorting to force,272 however far-fetched it might be in some situations
especially regarding attacks of a smaller scale.273
In discussing the separation of the notions and especially in arguing on the basis of the
drafting process and the travaux préparatoires of the Charter, it should be kept in mind that
the collective security system envisioned in the Charter differs from the one that it has
developed to. The Cold War effectively paralyzed the Security Council for decades and no
special agreements pursuant to Article 43 have been concluded to make armed forces
available to the Security Council.274 Justifying the separation of armed attacks and force on
the basis of the text of the Charter and the travaux préparatoires thus warrants a critical
look. If Article 51 was meant as a mechanism which could only be resorted to in the most
grave forms of the use of force and in cases where the Security Council has not yet acted –
as can be construed from the text of Article 51, seeing how it only gives the right to self-
defence 'until the Security Council has taken measures' – Articles 43–49 gain much more
significance which has never materialized. Thus, a central element of the original Charter
system is missing. In other words, if the forces never made available to the Security
Council were meant to address also those uses of force not constituting armed attacks, it
begs the question whether or not the higher threshold for armed attacks is still justified.
That said, good arguments remain for the separation, among which is the avoidance of a
spiralling use of force. Also, Tarcisio Gazzini argues that even assuming the effective
functioning of the collective security system, the disconnect between the notions of force
and armed attack would still represent an 'unrealistic loophole'.275
To summarize, the prevailing view is that there is a difference between the notions of force
and armed attack. There are arguments to challenge the view, and de lege ferenda claims
that the gap is shrinking have some support in state practice. However, the text of the
Charter and the repeated interpretations by the International Court of Justice cannot be
easily bypassed.
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5.2.3 Assistance as an Armed Attack?
The Court concluded in Nicaragua that the supply of weapons or logistical or other support
to the rebels did not amount to an armed attack. This could, however, according to the
Court be regarded as a threat or use of force as well as an intervention in the affairs of
other states.276 The Court held the same view in 2005 in Armed Activities on the Territory
of the Congo, where Uganda argued unsuccessfully that logistical support to armed bands
with knowledge of their objectives might constitute an armed attack.277 In a dissenting
opinion to the Nicaragua judgment, Judge Jennings saw that the provision of arms coupled
with 'other kinds of involvement' may be an important element of an armed attack.278
Dissenting Judge Schwebel disagreed with the majority and took the position that the
Nicaragua was indeed 'substantially involved' in supporting of the insurgents in a way
referred to in the Definition of Aggression, and that the substantial involvement was
enough to justify self-defence.279 Christine Gray, for example, does not find the view of the
dissenting Judges persuasive and finds no support for their argumentation. The Security
Council has also discussed the supply of arms or other forms of support in several cases,
but never has it considered them to amount to an armed attack.280
It also seems improbable that assistance in the context of cyber operations would constitute
an armed attack. It might, of course, be possible for a state to supply a ready-made cyber
attack for a non-state actor to be launched, or such guidance that it would, at least
following the view of Judges Jennings and Schwebel, constitute an armed attack –
provided, of course, that the resulting attack would be of sufficient gravity. However, such
close connection with the attack would probably mean that the question would be
approached from the side of state responsibility and whether or not the attack would be
attributable to a state.
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5.3 Acts of Non-State Actors as Armed Attacks?
5.3.1 Acts by Irregular Forces
Article 2(4) refers explicitly to member states and bans them from using force, whereas
Article 51 does provide for member states the right to self-defence against an armed attack
without reference to the perpetrator. There has been debate about the issue since the
Nicaragua judgment by the International Court of Justice, and some, such as Yoram
Dinstein, have argued that just as the target state is entitled to exercise self-defence against
an attack by another state, it is empowered to defend itself against a group operating within
that state.281 Indeed, there is nothing in the text of the Charter to prima facie prevent such a
reading. The prevailing view is that Article 51 covers the acts of states and acts committed
by non-state actors that are attributable to the state.282
The question has been prominent after the 9/11 attacks, and the Security Council has
several times referred to international terrorism as a threat to the peace since the 9/11
attacks and passed several resolutions imposing sanctions in response to terrorism.283 It has
not, however, responded to terrorism by explicitly mandating the use of force.284 The
United States stated it was exercising its right to individual and collective self-defence and
cited the 9/11 attacks and an ongoing threat.285 As much as the issue has been debated after
the 9/11 attacks, using self-defence as the legal basis for responding to acts of terrorism is
by no means an occurrence brought on by 9/11. Portugal claimed it was acting in self-
defence in response to terrorist acts from Guinea, Senegal and Zambia in the 1960s and
1970s. Such claims were also made by the South African apartheid regime and Israel.
These claims were by and large not accepted, but the circumstances were rather different:
for example Portugal claimed to be defending its colonies in the midst of decolonization.286
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In Nicaragua, the ICJ took the position that actions by irregular forces ('armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries') against another state may constitute an armed attack if
the forces are sent by or on behalf of a state and if the actions are of certain gravity. That is,
if the scale and effects of the actions are comparable to an attack by the regular forces. The
Court refers to the description in Article 3(g) of the Definition of Aggression resolution,
which, according to the Court, may be taken to reflect customary international law.287 The
Article defines the sending of irregular forces who carry out acts of armed force as an act
of aggression if the acts carried out are of sufficient gravity against a state. Also a
'substantial involvement' in the sending of the armed bands suffices. The application of
such a concept has been more controversial than its existence, and much of the debate and
disagreement has primarily been about whether there has been an armed attack in the first
place.288
The Court touched upon the issue of irregular forces again in its Wall Advisory Opinion of
2004, which concerned the building of a wall by Israel in the West Bank. Israel claimed it
was acting in self-defence, but the Court found that Article 51 had no relevance in the case.
The majority interpreted Article 51 as recognizing the right to self-defence in cases of
armed attacks by states against another states but noted that Israel had not claimed that the
attacks against it were in fact imputable to a state.289 Judge Higgins in his dissenting
opinion finds this to be a result of the determination the Court made in Nicaragua and
notes that nothing in the text of Article 51 specifies that self-defence would only be
available against armed attacks by states.290 Also relevant was the fact that the threat Israel
referred to originated from Israeli-controlled Occupied Palestinian Territory and the
question was not thus of international terrorism.291 Judge Kooijmans, in his separate
opinion, regrets that the Court did not take notice of the 'new approach' to self-defence as
manifested in the Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), where the
Security Council recognized the right to self-defence in cases of international terrorism
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without referencing a state as the perpetrator.292 Then again, as Christine Gray points out,
the Court did not explicitly say that the right of self-defence exists only in cases of attacks
by a state. The Court noted that Article 51 had no relevance in the case because of the non-
international nature of the threat and the lack of claim by Israel imputing another state. The
opinion could then also be interpreted as leaving open the possibility of armed attacks by
non-state actors justifying self-defence in cases of international terrorism.293 Indeed, the
Court refers to the aforementioned Security Council resolutions and explicitly states that
the situation was different from them.294
Another case where the Court was again faced with the issue of irregular forces and self-
defence is the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. The Court found there to be
no proof that the attacks against Uganda were carried out by irregular forces sent by or on
behalf of the Democratic Republic of Congo.295 Because of the circumstances, the Court
noted that it had no need to examine the question of irregular forces and self-defence more
closely.296 This was to the chagrin of Judges Simma and Kooijmans who both would have
liked the Court to clarify its position regarding the actions a state could take in cases where
the involvement of a state could not be proved.297
The Tallinn Manual notes that the ICJ 'does not seem to have been prepared' to adopt the
approach taken by the United States after the 9/11 attacks, that is, invoking Article 51 and
using self-defence as a justification for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.298
The Manual refers to the Wall Advisory Opinion and the Armed Activities judgment, both
of which were discussed above. Such a view of the ICJ is not necessarily well reasoned. As
mentioned, the circumstances taken as a whole in Wall led to the dismissal of the claim of
self-defence: the attacks originated from Israeli-occupied territory and Israel did not
impute them to another state. In Armed Activities the Court found there to be no evidence
of a state being behind the attacks. It should also be noted that even though it was Al-
Qaeda that carried out the 9/11 attacks, the United States in its letter to the Security
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Council explicitly refers to the support given to Al-Qaeda by the Taliban regime of
Afghanistan and notes that the regime is controlling parts of Afghanistan and allowing
those parts to be used as bases of operation, as well as that the regime refused to change its
policy.299 In other words, the United States relied not only on the terrorist attacks
perpetrated by Al-Qaeda as the basis for self-defence but also on the acts of the Taliban
regime which at the time de facto governed parts of Afghanistan. That said, the majority of
the group behind the Tallinn Manual agreed that state practice established a right of self-
defence also in response to attacks by non-state actors and groups but recognized the
'significant uncertainty' as to for example the degree of organization such a group must
have.300
5.3.2 Level of Control for State Responsibility
For a state to be responsible for the acts of non-state actors, it has to have a certain level of
control over the acts. In Nicaragua, the ICJ formulated the so-called 'effective control' test:
for a state to be responsible, it had to be proved that the state had effective control of the
acts.301 The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) took a different view on the level of control required for acts to
attributable to a state in the Tadić case. The Chamber did not 'hold the Nicaragua test to be
persuasive' for two reasons: it was considered to be inconsistent with the logic of the law of
state responsibility and to be inconsistent with judicial and state practice.302 Instead, the
ICTY applied an 'overall control' test, which is less strict than the one used by the ICJ.
According to the Chamber, it is sufficient for the attribution of acts to the state that the
group as a whole is under the overall control of the state.303 This means that in the case of
militias or paramilitary units the state did not have to issue specific orders or direct each
individual operation for the acts to be attributable to the state. A role in organising,
coordinating or planning the military actions sufficed, in addition to financing, training,
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equipping and providing operational support. With less organized groups or individuals the
threshold is higher.304
The International Court of Justice considered the different standards in the Genocide case.
The Court stated that in determining whether an armed conflict was international, the
overall control test put forth by the ICTY might well be applicable and suitable. The ICJ
however disagreed with the ICTY on whether or not it was applicable in determining
whether a state was responsible for acts committed by non-state actors. The ICJ noted that
different tests may be applied in resolving the issues without logical inconsistency. In the
view of the ICJ, using the overall control test in issues of state responsibility broadens
the scope too much and stretches the connection between the organs of the state and
the responsibility of the state too far.305 Nevertheless, while there is disagreement as to the
level of control needed to incur the responsibility of the state, the Courts agreed that it is
indeed possible for the acts of non-state actors to be attributed to a state.
Self-defence against non-state actors might also be available in situations where a state is
unable to prevent its territory to be used in preparation or carrying out terrorist attacks.306
This widens the possibilities of responding to terrorist attacks by self-defence considerably.
It should be reminded that also these acts of self-defence are subject to the requirements of
necessity and proportionality, so even a relatively wide interpretation of whose acts can be
countered with self-defence does not provide a carte blanche for the use of force. The
Tallinn Manual adopted a similar view regarding cyber operations and noted that if a state
is unable or unwilling to take actions to repress the attack, self-defence is permissible.
Interestingly, the Manual noted that the inability might stem from the lack of expertise or
technology.307 It should be reminded, though, that in all such questions the requirement of
necessity would arguably not allow for self-defence if the attack could also be deterred by
providing technical assistance to the state in question.
To summarize the issue of acts of irregular forces, it is possible for acts of non-state actors
to qualify as armed attacks if they are attributable to a state or if the state knowingly allows
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for its territory to be used for terrorist activity or is unable to prevent such activity. The
responsibility of a state lies, as Michael Schmitt writes, on a continuum.308 And as the
ICTY stated in Tadić, the extent of the control varies.309 The problem of attribution
regarding cyber operations is twofold: firstly, it is possible to cover the original source of
the operation so that it is difficult if not impossible to quickly determine the origin at all.
Secondly, it is possible to fake the source of the operation so that it appears at least  prima
facie to originate from a different source. And even in cases where the true origin can be
determined, it might take a considerable amount of time to reverse-engineer or otherwise
decipher the attack sufficiently to reveal the origin. It should also be kept in mind that in
some cases it may well be in the interests of the attacker to make it known who was behind
the attack. And in cases where cyber attacks are carried out in tandem with other actions it
might even be obvious.
5.4 Cyber Operations as Armed Attacks?
The Tallinn Manual adopts the position that uses of force that injure or kill persons or
damage or destroy property do satisfy the scale and effects requirement derived from the
Nicaragua judgment and thus qualify as armed attacks.310 Conversely, cyber espionage and
operations that merely cause brief or periodic interruption of non-essential services do not
count. Such a view is well justified, and indeed there seems to be a consensus that at least
attacks that have resulted in lethal results or significant property damage may constitute an
armed attack.311 As with traditional armed attacks, the exact point of the threshold of an
armed attack is however unclear.312 In Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice
distinguished between mere frontier incidents and armed attacks,313 and in Oil Platforms
did not exclude the possibility of the mining of a single military ship constituting an armed
attack.314 It would thus seem that the operation does not have to be widespread for it to
cross the threshold of an armed attack. For example a cyber attack causing death, injury,
damage or destruction on a single target could thus constitute an armed attack.
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As is the case with the notion of force and cyber operations, some have argued for setting
the threshold much lower, and have for example analogized denial-of-service attacks with
naval blockades and claimed that as such they can qualify as armed attacks.315 While such
an analogy is an interesting one, it lacks support and compelling justification and is
weakened by a number of issues. The reasoning goes that blocking access to
communications networks can be likened to blocking access to sea or to airspace. One
problem has to do with the technical nature of the denial-of-service attacks: they are
usually directed at certain specific sites – in the case of Estonia, mostly governmental
websites and banking websites.316 These kinds of attacks only affect the sites in question,
and perhaps sites hosted on the same servers.317 If the viewpoint in the case of a naval
blockade is that of those behind the blockade, that is, those unable to access the sea at all,
the situation is not a comparable to someone being unable to access only a certain website
but being able to access all others.
The analogy of a naval blockade would seem more reasonable in cases where the the users
could not access any websites at all because of the attack. During the Estonian incident
some attacks on the domain name servers (or DNS servers) succeeded in temporarily
disrupting the DNS services around the country,318 which could effectively block the users
of the affected server from accessing any website.319 Also Article 41 of the UN Charter
may be recalled here. The Article states that the Security Council may decide what
measures not involving the use of force are to be employed and notes that such measures
may include complete or partial interruption of for example communications means.
Taking account the consequences and the nature of denial-of-service attacks, it is more
reasonable to analogize them with the disruption of communications not amounting to a
use of force referred to in Article 41 of the Charter than the blockade mentioned in Article
315 See e.g. Sheng Li, 'When Does Internet Denial Trigger the Right of Armed Self-Defense', 38 Yale 
Journal of International Law (2013) 179–216 at 191, 200.
316 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, supra note 60 at 22.
317 A hypothetical example: if the website of the Faculty of Law of the University of Helsinki is a target of a
denial-of-service attack, the users might (depending on the hosting arrangements) also be unable to 
access the website of the Faculty of Medicine. The attack would not, however, block the user from 
accessing any other websites.
318 Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents, supra note 60 at 21.
319 If the DNS servers are unable to respond, the attack would effectively prevent the client computer from 
knowing where it should connect to. It is also worth noting that changing to another DNS server would 
bypass the effect of such attacks. While such a change is not necessarily a feasible alternative for a 
common user, it is technically a trivial task that can be done in less than a minute.
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42. It thus seems highly unlikely that a denial-of-service attack could ever constitute an
armed attack, even in cases of extensive attack as in Estonia in 2007, without a significant
change in the whole notion of an armed attack. It is doubtful that such attacks could
constitute force either, unless the notion of force evolves so that the economic damage
would be enough to cross the threshold.
Because a cyber attack might be effectively carried out in fractions of a second, some have
mentioned the idea of automatic self-defence.320 Such a concept has several problems, one
of which is the identification of the attacker. As discussed earlier, the true origin of the
attack may be masked and the prima facie source of the attack might turn out to be merely
a conduit. Attacking such a target does nothing to cease the attack even if it were still on-
going321 and it would highly likely be unlawful as well.322 Another, arguably the most
important issue is that of correctly identifying attacks that warrant a response. Wrongly
interpreted signals of attacks incur the risk of escalation,323 and the risk is especially
pertinent to cyber attacks because of the speed with which the attacks and responses may
be carried out. It should be reminded, though, that active defence may also very well be
cautiously used in a manner that neither risks escalation nor presents problems with the jus
ad bellum.
Some members of the group behind the Tallinn Manual argued for a view that would put
more weight on the severity of the consequences of a cyber attack and not only on the
physical consequences. An example of an attack with severe but not physical consequences
would be one against a stock exchange.324 While the economic consequences of such an
attack could indeed be catastrophic and thus might even warrant a reappraisal of the
question of economic force, there seems to be no support for such view de lege lata. The
320 See e.g. Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, supra note 57 at 106. Dinstein also 
recognizes the difficulties with such an approach.
321 The attack traffic could merely end up taking another route. Supra at 19.
322 Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense, supra note 57 at 107.
323 For examples of dangers caused by false alarms see Jeffery L. Caton, 'Exploring the Prudent Limits of 
Automated Cyber Attack' in K. Podins, J. Stinissen, M. Maybaum (eds), 2013 5th International 
Conference on Cyber Conflict Proceedings (NATO CCD COE Publications: Tallinn, 2013), 145–160 at 
149–152.
324 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 56–57 and Michael N. Schmitt, 'International Law in 
Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxtaposed', 54 Harvard International Law Journal 
Online (2012) at 22. The issue was also discussed in the context of the notion of force, supra at 42.
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other members of the Tallinn Manual group took a similar position and accepted the
possibility of the interpretation developing to such an approach in the future.325
As regards self-defence, the requirement of necessity may be a somewhat problematic one
regarding computer network attacks. Data travels through the networks at ever increasing
speeds, and the attack may be carried out in a very short period of time. A strict
interpretation of the necessity requirement would thus make it in practice very difficult if
not completely impossible to resort to self-defence in response to cyber attacks, as the
attack could already be over when it is discovered. An example of a prolonged cyber attack
would be a denial-of-service attack, but as it generally does not constitute a use of force,
much less an armed attack, it is not significant in this context. Yoram Dinstein argues that
the victim state must be given a 'reasonable window to respond'. He also argues that the
recourse to self-defence may be lawful even when the interval between the initial attack
and the response 'is longer than usual', if the delay is exculpated by circumstances.326
Following such reasoning, the delay caused by determining the attacker could indeed count
as an exculpatory circumstance. That said, unless there was a threat of further attacks, the
response would arguably still be vulnerable to criticism of being retaliatory. The possibility
of self-defence based on the threat of further attacks will be more closely examined in
chapter 5.5.2.
5.5 Anticipatory Self-Defence
5.5.1 Possibility of Anticipatory Self-Defence
The text of Article 51 of the UN Charter articulates a right to self-defence 'if an armed
attack occurs'. The Article has been interpreted in varying ways regarding whether or not
the Article only applies in situations where an armed attack has already taken place or
whether it allows for anticipatory self-defence as well. The scholarly interpretations of
Article 51 can with some simplification be divided to four categories:327 the first group
rejects the legality of anticipatory self-defence.328 The second allows for self-defence in
cases of incipient attacks or already launched attacks which have not yet reached their
325 Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace, supra note 324 at 22. 
326 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 267.
327 T. D. Gill, 'The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defence: Anticipation, Pre-emption, Prevention and 
Immediacy', 11 Journal of Conflict & Security Law (2006) 361–369 at 367.
328 See e.g. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, supra note 97 at 278.
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target (this has been referred to as interceptive self-defence by Yoram Dinstein).329 The
third group sees the Article as allowing for self-defence in the cases of an immediate threat
of an attack which has not yet been launched. And the fourth one argues that anticipatory
self-defence is allowed also in cases where there is a more indeterminate possibility of an
attack in the future. No clear consensus on the issue exists, and another question is whether
or not the right to self-defence based on customary international law is in this sense wider
and allows for anticipatory action. Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck argue that
there is a general agreement that the pre-Charter customary international law included a
right to anticipatory self-defence subject to the requirements of necessity and
proportionality derived from the Caroline incident.330 Albrecht Randelzhofer considers the
view that excludes the possibility of any self-defence other than that based on Article 51 in
response to an armed attack to be the prevailing one, but it should be noted, that he sees the
opposing view as a very wide one and as including not just anticipatory self-defence but
for example the forceful protection of economic interests in a foreign country.331
While a strict textual reading of Article 51 certainly makes it possible to claim that it does
not allow for any kind of anticipatory self-defence, it seems counterintuitive to claim the
Charter requires states to patiently wait for an attack to occur before they can act, in worst
cases effectively making it a suicide pact. Article 2(4) prohibits states from using force, but
the ban is not without exceptions. The United Nations strives, according to the Preamble of
the Charter to ensure 'that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest'. In
other words, it is certainly accepted that in certain cases the use of force is necessary, even
though the ultimate goal is to achieve peace. Such a concept is inherently tensional, and as
Martti Koskenniemi and others note, it is at the same time impossible and necessary to
accept the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as a part of the international legal
system.332
Using a strict textual interpretation of Article 51 as a basis for dismissing any possibility of
anticipatory self-defence also seems to overlook the fact that the collective security system
329 See e.g. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 203–205.
330 Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force – Beyond the UN 
Charter Paradigm (Routledge: London 1993) at 72.
331 Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note 140 at 792–793.
332 Martti Koskenniemi, 'Oikeus ja asevoiman käyttö uudessa maailmassa', Lakimies 1/2003 90–95 at 95. 
For a similar argument regarding humanitarian intervention and an overview of scholars sharing the 
same view see Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much', supra note 183 at 162.
66
envisaged in the Charter never turned out the way it was intended. While the issue more
closely relates to the debate about the existence of a gap between the thresholds of force
and armed attack,333 it is still noteworthy that the Security Council has in practice been less
able to react to threats to peace than originally planned. The most obvious example of this
is probably that of Kosovo.
The possibility of anticipatory self-defence has been criticized on the basis that because
there is usually no objective criteria to assess the imminence of an attack, the decision
would be left to the discretion of the state.334 While the argument is not without merit,
a restrictive view of Article 51 still would leave open the question of what constitutes an
armed attack and similarly leave much to the discretion of the state. As the cases before the
International Court of Justice, the scholarly debate and the differing interpretations by
states has shown, no explicit objective criteria by which to assess the acts exists. And even
if such criteria were to exist, it would inevitably face the problems of over- and under-
inclusiveness already mentioned regarding the notion of force.335
The International Court of Justice noted the question of self-defence in response to an
imminent threat of an armed attack in Nicaragua, but did not express a view on the issue
since neither party invoked it.336 The uncertain status of pre-emptive self-defence is also
reflected in state practice: states generally prefer to interpret the notion of an armed attack
expansively and justify self-defence on that basis rather than invoke the right to
anticipatory self-defence.337 The disagreement of states has also prevented the inclusion of
any detailed provisions in the General Assembly resolutions touching upon the issue of
self-defence, such as the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Definition of
Aggression.338
While more than 170 years have passed since the Caroline plunged down the Niagara Falls
in flames and Daniel Webster wrote the famous letter in which he formulated the
prerequisites for lawful anticipatory self-defence, they still remain useful. As Oscar
Schachter writes, the formulation of Webster meets the idea of opposing the pre-emptive
333 Discussed supra at 55.
334 Randelzhofer, Article 51, supra note 140 at 803.
335 Supra at 37.
336 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 194.
337 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, supra note 214 at 161.
338 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, supra note 214 at 160.
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resort to force but acknowledges its necessity in cases where the attack is of such nature
that it would be absurd to demand for the targeted state to wait before defending itself.339
There are contrary views as well, and for example Myres McDougal and Florentino
Feliciano see the formulation to be 'so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to
impose paralysis'.340 Abraham Sofaer argues that the language should not be applied as a
general rule for all pre-emptive actions and that the standard applicable to pre-emptive
self-defence is the same that applies to all uses of force.341
A 2004 report by a UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change stated that
according to 'long established international law', a state can take military action as long as
the threatened attack is 'imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is
proportionate'.342 The report does not refer to Article 51, whereas a 2005 report of the
Secretary-General states that 'imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51'.343
5.5.2 Anticipatory Self-Defence and Cyber Attacks
Cyber operations pose some challenges for the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. Some
of these, such as the question of the level of certainty and proof needed, are shared with
kinetic attacks, but in addition to these, there are issues specific to cyber operations. It can,
for example, be difficult to determine whether an intrusion into a system or a network is
merely espionage or the first stage of a destructive attack. In fact, during the early stages of
their analysis, security researchers believed Stuxnet to be another tool for industrial
espionage,344 and in other cases software errors have caused consequences which could be
interpreted as resulting from a cyber attack.345 A strict interpretation of the temporal limits
of self-defence would practically render it impossible to respond to cyber attacks in self-
defence. The attack might be prepared in secrecy and there might not be any external
339 Oscar Schachter, 'In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force', 53 University of Chicago Law 
Review (1986) 113–146 at 136.
340 Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order (Yale 
University Press: New Haven, 1961) at 217.
341 Abraham D. Sofaer, 'On the Necessity of Pre-emption', 14 European Journal of International Law 
(2003) 209–226 at 220.
342 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. UN Doc. A/59/565 at para. 188.
343 In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-
General. UN Doc. A/59/2005 at para. 124.
344 Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, supra note 69.
345 Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour E. Hoffman and Kevin J. Soo Hoo, Information Warfare and 
International Law (National Defense University: Washington, D.C. 1998) at 21–22.
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pointers of an impending attack as in the case of a traditional kinetic attack, such as
gathering of troops near a border or strengthening a fleet at sea.346 And the attack itself
might only take fractions of a second to carry out, and the physical consequences might or
might or might not be instantaneous. Either the acts of self-defence would be anticipatory
or carried out after the attack has already taken place. The majority of the group behind the
Tallinn Manual took the view that even though Article 51 does not explicitly allow for
anticipatory self-defence, a state need not wait in cases where a cyber attack rising to the
level of an armed attack is 'imminent'.347
The Tallinn Manual correctly distinguishes between the insertion of a logic bomb and the
placement of a remotely activated malware. A logic bomb refers to a piece of software that
will execute the attack based on some predetermined factors without a further external
command, as distinct from a malware that requires an external command for the attack to
commence. The Manual analogizes the situation with the laying of naval mines in shipping
lanes and takes the position that the insertion of a logic bomb qualifies as an armed attack
if the conditions for activation 'are likely to occur'. A mere placement of the malware to the
targeted computer or a network does not, however, meet the criterion of imminence. Such
is the case also with the placement of a backdoor – that is, a piece of software allowing
unauthorized access to a system. This does not yet imply an imminent attack and thus does
not in and of itself justify self-defence.348 Self-defence becomes justified when the attacker
has decided to launch the attack and the target state faces a situation where postponing the
defensive act would deprive it from effectively defending itself.349 Such a view is justified
and in line with position of the aforementioned UN High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change. The problem, of course, is recognizing and differentiating
between the situations in practice.
As regards the requirement of immediacy and the question whether or not states can act in
self-defence after the cyber attack has concluded, the Tallinn Manual takes the position that
states may act in self-defence after the attack has ceased if it is reasonable to conclude that
such attacks are likely to follow. In these cases, the Manual presents, the state may treat the
346 Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra note 165 at 90.
347 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 63.
348 Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra note 165 at 90.
349 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 65.
69
attacks as a 'cyber campaign'.350 Without such a conclusion, the self-defence may be seen as
retaliatory. The Manual speaks of a cyber campaign, but it should also be noted that the
attacks likely to follow may also be other than cyber attacks. In fact, as cyber attacks can
be used as a first phase of a wider attack to prepare the battlefield, the following attacks
may very well be other than cyber operations. An attacking state might, for example, first
aim to disable or disturb the military communications networks of the target state by a
cyber attack and then launch a kinetic attack.351 If such an attack were imminent, the victim
state could legally act in self-defence.
It may also be the case that the fact that a cyber attack has occurred only becomes apparent
after a longer period of time. The Tallinn Manual uses the Stuxnet incident as an example
of such an attack and argues that the criterion of immediacy is not met in such cases, and
that self-defence is only possible in cases where further attacks are imminent.352 While it is
true that the consequences of a cyber attack may well become known only after some time
has passed or that it may only be discovered later on that some previously apparent
consequences were indeed the result of a cyber attack, it is doubtful that such attacks
would in most cases qualify as armed attacks anyway due to their consequences probably
being less severe. There might of course also be attacks attacks whose consequences are
instantaneously evident and sufficiently grave but whose perpetrator is only identified later
on. While the 2007 attacks on Estonia do not qualify as armed attacks, they are a fitting
example of the problems of ascertaining who is behind the attacks. The Tallinn Manual
takes the position that self-defence in such cases too is only possible if further attacks are
imminent.353 As mentioned earlier, Yoram Dinstein argues that the circumstances of the
attack may justify a longer period of time between the initial attack and the response,354 and
the investigation of a cyber attack could well count as such circumstances.
350 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 66.
351 Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War, supra note 165 at 82.
352 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 66.
353 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 66.
354 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 267.
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5.6 Conclusions About Self-Defence
The notion of self-defence remains controversial. No clear rules exist as to when states
may act in self-defence, and neither is there any clear rules on which kinds of acts are
justified in terms of their proportionality. The International Court of Justice, scholars and
states have varying interpretations of the UN Charter and the customary international law
rules, and in fact, also of the very relationship between the Charter and customary
international law. And no exact rules even could exist. Ultimately, the question is of a case-
by-case analysis. The distinction between uses of force and armed attacks continues to
divide opinions, but the prevailing view is that they indeed are different and, as the
International Court of Justice stated in Nicaragua, only the most grave forms of the use of
force constitute an armed attack.355
Just as a cyber operation may constitute a use of force, it may also rise to the level of an
armed attack. Such attacks are exceptional, and as the Tallinn Manual notes, no attacks
have as of 2012 been unambiguously characterized by the international community as
armed attacks. Some members of the group behind the Manual did, however, argue that
Stuxnet in fact reached the level of an armed attack.356 Assuming that the public reports of
the consequences caused by Stuxnet are true, classifying the operation as an armed attack
would lower the threshold quite far. It seems indisputable that Stuxnet caused physical
damage: subsequent analysis showed that the malware tampered with the frequencies of
the rotors in a way that could cause damage and at the same time an unusual number of
centrifuges had to be replaced at Natanz.357 That said, the damage was somewhat limited,
and it would seem that the operation did constitute a use of force but that the consequences
remained below the threshold of an armed attack. More severe physical damage, injury or
death would, on the other hand, been enough to qualify the operation as an armed attack.
Because of the nature of cyber attacks, especially the possibly very short duration of the
active phase of an attack, responses are practically limited to those used after the initial
attack. Such acts are prone to criticism of being retaliatory in nature if the requirement of
necessity is interpreted strictly. Dinstein however argues that the lapse of time between the
355 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 191.
356 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 57–58.
357 For a closer look at Stuxnet, see supra at 14.
71
initial attack and the response does not by itself give the response a punitive character.358
He also suggests that circumstances may justify a longer period between the initial attack
and the response.359 And as discussed with regard to pre-emptive self-defence, a response is
also justified if there is a threat of the attacks continuing. In any case, it should be kept in
mind that the responses are also subject to the requirement of proportionality.
358 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 251–252.
359 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, supra note 41 at 267.
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6 Principle of Non-Intervention and Countermeasures
6.1 Principle of Non-Intervention
As discussed in the previous chapters, for an operation to be qualified as a of use of force
or as an armed attack, it has to reach a certain level of gravity. There is, however, a
plethora of actions that may not cross the threshold of the use of force, let alone an armed
attack, but are still questionable in terms of their legality in light of international law. Such
acts may for example be used to erode trust in institutions such as governments and
companies,360 and they may be breaches of the principle of non-intervention and may
justify countermeasures as a response. This chapter takes a brief look at the principle and
countermeasures as well as acts of retorsion in the context of cyber operations. Also the
issue of criminal jurisdiction will be briefly mentioned.
The International Court of Justice stated in Nicaragua that the principle of non-
intervention, the right of every sovereign state to conduct its affairs without outside
interference, is part and parcel of customary international law.361 The principle has also
been stated in UN General Assembly Resolutions, such as the Friendly Relations
Declaration362 and the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.363 The UN
Charter does not explicitly refer to the principle of non-intervention, yet it may be seen as
being included in several of the Charter provisions referencing the sovereignty of states.364
The principle has also been included or referenced in several other treaties.365
As formulated in the Friendly Relations Declaration, the principle of non-intervention
indicates that no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another
state. Consequently, the Declaration continues, armed intervention and all other forms of
360 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, supra note 53 at 26.
361 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 202.
362 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 115.
363 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131 (XX), 21 December 1965.
364 Terry D. Gill, 'Non-Intervention in the Cyber Context' in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed.), Peacetime Regime 
for State Activities in Cyberspace – International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy (NATO 
CCD COE Publications: Tallinn, 2013), 217–238 at 220.
365 For an overview, see Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, 'The Principle of Non-intervention', 
22 Leiden Journal of International Law (2009) 345–381 at 362–367.
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interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or political, economic
and cultural elements of the state are in violation of international law. The Declaration also
notes that no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another state, and that no state shall inter alia organize, assist, finance
or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow
of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state. While the
formulation is somewhat ambiguous, the core meaning of an intervention is fairly clear.366
There is a close relationship between the notions of intervention and the use of force, and
the two are partly overlapping.367 A threat or use of force constitutes an intervention,368 but
the notion of intervention also includes lesser acts of coercive nature that fall under the
threshold of the use of force, and those are of interest in the present chapter.
6.2 Countermeasures
6.2.1 Right to Countermeasures
States who have been subjected to an intervention by another state under the threshold of
an armed attack may respond by countermeasures and acts of retorsion. In cases of attacks
by individuals or groups whose conduct is not attributable to a state, the state may exercise
national criminal jurisdiction. All of these may be useful depending on the situation, yet
they share a variety of potential problems, not least of which being the effectiveness of
each of them.369 According to the commentary of the International Law Commission on the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, countermeasures are 'measures that would otherwise
be contrary to the international obligations of an injured state vis-à-vis the responsible
State' which are carried out as a response to an internationally wrongful conduct.370 Article 2
of the Draft Articles states that an internationally wrongful act consists of two elements:
the act is attributable to the state under international law and it constitutes a breach of an
international obligation of the state. The breach may relate to treaty-based obligations of a
state or those stemming from customary international law.371 Also an omission may
constitute an internationally wrongful act. 
366 Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber Context, supra note 364 at 222.
367 Jamnejad and Wood, The Principle of Non-intervention, supra note 365 at 348.
368 Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber Context, supra note 364 at 221.
369 Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber Context, supra note 364 at 228, 231.
370 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 324–325.
371 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 71.
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The ILC commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility acknowledges the
previous usage of the term reprisal, but notes that it is no longer widely used in the context
of countermeasures due to the association with belligerent reprisals in the context of
international humanitarian law.372 The notion of reprisals also was wider than that of
countermeasures as it included both forceful and non-forceful acts373 as well as acts that
were punitive in character.374 Traditional examples of countermeasures include inter alia
the freezing of assets of a state and the suspension of a trade agreement.375 According to the
prevailing view, countermeasures must be non-forceful, and the Friendly Relations
Declaration clearly notes that states have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving
the use of force.376 In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the International Court of
Justice took the same position and stated that armed reprisals in the time of peace are
considered unlawful.377 According to Article 50 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, countermeasures shall not affect the obligation to refrain from the threat or
use of force as embodied in the UN Charter. As the Charter only allows the use of force in
self-defence or with the authorization of the Security Council, it thus effectively outlawed
armed reprisals.378 The ILC commentary on the Draft Articles describes the limitation as a
fundamental substantive obligation and notes that the prohibition is consistent with the
prevailing doctrine and refers to the Friendly Relations Declaration as well as judgments of
the International Court of Justice and UN Security Council Resolutions.379
As the other element of an internationally wrongful act is the attributability of the act to a
state, the question of attribution is as relevant to countermeasures as it is to self-defence
and it involves the same kind of problems.380 The ILC commentary on the Draft Articles
372 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 181.
373 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures' in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed.), 
Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace – International Law, International Relations and 
Diplomacy (NATO CCD COE Publications: Tallinn, 2013), 659–690 at 662.
374 Derek W. Bowett, 'Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force', 66 The American Journal of 
International Law (1972) 1–36 at 3.
375 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 331.
376 Nigel White and Ademola Abass, 'Countermeasures and Sanctions' in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), 
International Law (3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2010), 531–558 at 532.
377 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29 at para. 46.
378 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, supra note 97 at 281. Also McCoubrey and 
White, International Law and Armed Conflict, supra note 111 at 111–112.
379 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 333–334.
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75
recognizes the difficulty in determining when a wrongful act is sufficiently attributable to a
state.381 The ILC quotes the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and states that it is
necessary to identify with reasonable certainty the actors and their association with the
state.382 This, again, is especially relevant to cyber operations. As discussed, the true origin
of cyber operations may well be masked so as to lead the victim state to believe that the
attacker is someone else.383 The true origin of the attack might be revealed by subsequent,
more time-consuming analysis, but this might happen much later than the operation
actually took place.384 Reasonable certainty is, of course, a rather ambiguous level of
certitude and no clear rules for what kind of evidence is enough to fulfil the requirement
cannot be set forth. The question is one to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
As the previously discussed aspects of international law, also the law of state responsibility
applies to cyber operations of states as well.385 In other words, if the conditions are met,
states may respond to cyber attacks conducted on them as well as use cyber operations as
countermeasures themselves. This view was also adopted in the Tallinn Manual.386
Countermeasures have been a relatively rare occurrence, especially since the end of the
Cold War. The legal uncertainty and the strict limitations of countermeasures combined
with the fact that states seem to steer clear of invoking the right to take countermeasures
when reacting to less grave uses of force suggests that the role of countermeasures will
remain less significant in the future as well. This is also the case with cyber
countermeasures too.387
Sanctions imposed on states by the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the
Charter may be similar to countermeasures, but they should be distinguished from them
due to the different legal basis. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council derive their
lawfulness from the Charter and the decisions of the Security Council.388
381 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 91.
382 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 83–84.
383 Supra at 19.
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6.2.2 Restrictions on Countermeasures
Countermeasures are subject to strict limitations. According to Article 49 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility an injured state may only take countermeasures against a
state which is responsible for an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that state to
comply with its obligations. It thus follows that no countermeasures can be taken if the
original wrongful act has already ceased. This is also expressly stated in Article 52(3)(a).
In other words, countermeasures may only be used in order to restore a state of lawfulness
and not for retaliation or punishment,389 nor in situations where the wrongful act has
already been committed and there is no threat of it being repeated.390 In the context of
cyber operations, this poses similar challenges than the temporal limitation of self-
defence:391 the attack may be over in a matter of seconds, after which the countermeasures
could easily be seen as retaliatory and thus contrary to Article 49 of the Draft Articles. As
the Tallinn Manual notes, however, states have sometimes appeared to carry out
countermeasures punitively, which according to the Manual makes it uncertain whether or
not the ILC commentary reflects customary international law.392
Even though the prevailing view is that countermeasures must be non-forceful, the debate
about the possibility of forceful countermeasures continues. It has for example been
suggested that there may be an emerging customary international law doctrine allowing
forceful countermeasures in the context of humanitarian intervention393 and the fight
against terrorism.394 Derek Bowett claimed in 1972 – that is, after the Friendly Relations
Declaration but before the Draft Articles on State Responsiblity – that due to the practice
of states, there existed a credibility gap and because of the separation from actual practice
the law on reprisals was degenerating. Bowett argues that the total outlawing of armed
reprisals presupposed 'a capacity for collective action to suppress any resort to unlawful
force' which had not been achieved, which in turn led states to resort to self-help.395
389 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 331.
390 Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, supra note 373 at 674–675.
391 Supra at 68.
392 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 37.
393 Antonio Cassese, 'Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are We Mving Towards International Legitimation of Forceible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?', 10 European Journal of International Law 
(1999) 23–30 at 27.
394 Michael J. Kelly, 'Time Warp to 1945 – Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-Defense 
Doctrines in International Law', 13 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy (2003) 1–39 at 19–22.
395 Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, supra note 374  at 1–2.
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Closely related to this issue is the debate about the separation of the notions of force and
armed attack.396 Some have argued that no gap exists between the two, which leads to the
conclusion that states have the right to act in self-defence in all cases where force is used
against them, not just in the most grave forms of the use of force.397 The position taken by
Judge Simma should also be recalled here: in a separate opinion to the Oil Platforms
decision, Simma suggests that the permissibility of 'strictly defensive military action' taken
against attacks that do not cross the threshold of an armed attack cannot be denied. He
suggests a distinction between full-scale self-defence (based on Article 51 of the UN
Charter) and lesser, proportionate defensive measures.398 Simma refers to the Nicaragua
judgment, where the Court noted that if the acts in question were imputable to Nicaragua,
they could only have justified 'proportionate counter-measures' by the victim states and not
by third states, 'and particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of force'.399
According to Simma, considering the context the Court cannot have meant 'mere pacific
reprisals'. The responses to less grave forms of attacks would be subject to requirements of
necessity, proportionality and immediacy in a particularly strict way.400 There is, however, a
lack of state practice and opinio juris supporting the view as states generally have justified
their actions as self-defence – even when it has meant, in the words of Thomas Franck,
resorting to creative fictions401 – and rejected the notion of armed reprisals.402
6.2.3 Proportionality and Necessity of Countermeasures
According to Article 51 of the Draft Articles, countermeasures must be commensurate with
the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the wrongful act and the rights in
question. Countermeasures are thus subject to a requirement of proportionality, but as
Michael Schmitt points out, the proportionality of countermeasures is different from the
notion of proportionality regarding self-defence.403 The proportionality of self-defence is
396 Discussed in more detail supra at 54.
397 See e.g. Taft, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, supra note 267 at 300–301 and Gazzini, 
Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law, supra note 213 at 138.
398 Oil Platforms, supra note 227, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma at para. 12
399 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 249.
400 Oil Platforms, supra note 227, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma at paras 12–13
401 Franck, Recourse to Force, supra note 273 at 112.
402 Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Rules of Force in International Law, supra note 213 at 169. For 
somewhat older examples of such claims see McCoubrey and White, International Law and Armed 
Conflict, supra note 111 at 114–115.
403 Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, supra note 373 at 682–683.
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measured against the level needed to repel the attack and may thus be of different gravity
than the original attack. The proportionality of countermeasures, however, stems from
harm suffered by the victim state. The ILC commentary on the Draft Articles notes that
reciprocal countermeasures – that is, countermeasures which involve the suspension of a
similar obligation to the one violated by the responsible state – are more likely to be
considered necessary and proportionate.404
Countermeasures are also subject to a requirement of necessity. Article 52(1) of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility states that before taking countermeasures, an injured state
shall call upon the responsible state to fulfil its obligations – in other words, cease the
wrongful act. The injured state must also notify the responsible state of any decision to
take countermeasures and offer to negotiate. This, too, may in practice present difficulties
for countermeasures in the cyber context.405 However, paragraph 2 of the Article states that
injured states may take such urgent countermeasures as are necessary to preserve its right
without notifying the responsible state first. The ILC commentary explicitly refers to the
possibility of the notification requirement frustrating its own purpose.406
The International Court of Justice has recognized countermeasures in several cases and
also referred to the requirement of their proportionality. In Nicaragua, the Court stated that
the acts that were of issue could only have justified proportionate countermeasures on the
part of the victim state.407 In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case the Court inter alia
reaffirmed the requirement of proportionality and stated that countermeasures must be
reversible.408 The ILC took a slightly less strict position and notes in the commentary to the
Draft Articles that countermeasures must be as far as possible reversible.409
6.2.4 Plea of Necessity
In addition to countermeasures, the Draft Articles on State Responsibility includes the
notion of the plea of necessity in Article 25. According to the Article, a state may invoke
404 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 326–327.
405 Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, supra note 385 at 677.
406 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 347.
407 Nicaragua, supra note 114 at para. 249.
408 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment), I. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7 at paras 83–
87.
409 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 327.
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necessity as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if it is the only way for the state to
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril and the act does not
seriously impair an essential interest of a state towards which the obligation exists or the
international community as a whole. The commentary of the ILC notes that the plea of
necessity will only rarely be available and it is subject to strict limitations to prevent
possible abuse.410 It is also noteworthy that no internationally wrongful act must exist for a
state to be able to invoke the plea of necessity.411
As necessity may only be invoked in very exceptional circumstances, it should not be seen
as substitute for self-defence or countermeasures, but rare as it may be, there is nothing to
absolutely exclude the possibility of a cyber attack constituting such a grave and imminent
peril that necessity does preclude the wrongfulness of the acts taken in response to the
attack.412 Even though the limitations are strict, the peril does not need to originate from a
state actor and the origin need not necessarily even be identified. This is especially relevant
to cyber operations, because of the possible difficulties in determining the origin of the
attack.413 Uncertainty of the origin does, of course, in practice set quite strict limits on the
possible responses. The Tallinn Manual notes that it is 'highly uncertain' whether or not a
state may use force in accordance with the plea of necessity.414
6.3 Acts of Retorsion
Acts of retorsion are, according to the view adopted by the International Law Commission,
distinct from countermeasures: they may be defined as unfriendly acts which are not itself
inconsistent with any international obligation of a state even though they may be a
response to an internationally wrongful act.415 Acts of retorsion may also be taken in
response to acts that in some way fall below the threshold of an intervention, for example
due to the lack of a coercive element.416 States may, of course, use them in response to
interventions as well, if they see them as adequate or otherwise the best alternative. Acts of
retorsion might include for example limitations on the diplomatic relations, embargoes or
410 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 195.
411 Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, supra note 385 at 663.
412 Geiß and Lahmann, Freedom and Security in Cyberspace, supra note 380 at 646, 648.
413 Schmitt, Cyber Activities and the Law of Countermeasures, supra note 385 at 663.
414 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 39.
415 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 325.
416 Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber Context, supra note 364 at 230.
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withdrawal of voluntary aid et cetera.417 The general principles of international law apply
to retorsions too, and also they are subject to the requirements of necessity and
proportionality.418
As with countermeasures, the exact content and limitations of retorsions make them
somewhat difficult tools for states to use in responding to cyber operations. Compared to
them, the concept of self-defence offers a more established and wide legal basis for
actions. Without any significant developments clarifying the situation, it is imaginable
states will continue to prefer the framework of self-defence.
6.4 Criminal Jurisdiction
While the focus of this thesis is on acts of states and those attributable to them, it bears
worth mentioning the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime419 (also known as the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime) which deals with criminal offences by individuals.
The Convention entered into force in 2004 and calls upon states to adopt legislation that
makes it a criminal offence under domestic law to for example access a computer system
without authorization (Article 2) and to damage, delete, deteriorate, alter or suppress
computer data (Article 4). It also includes provisions on issues such as jurisdiction,
cooperation between states and information exchange. The Convention has also been
signed and ratified by states which are not members of the Council of Europe, such as
Japan and the United States. While a closer look at the criminal justice paradigm regarding
cyber operations is outside the scope of this thesis, suffice it to say that prosecuting
individuals responsible for a cyber operations poses significant challenges as well.420 Many
of the most visible non-state cyber attacks such as the previously mentioned Sony
PlayStation Network breach and the hacking of several news outlet websites have been
carried out by individuals or groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec and have thus fit
within the purview of the Convention.
417 Report of the ILC, Fifty-third Session, supra note 99 at 325.
418 White and Abass, Countermeasures and Sanctions, supra note 376 at 538.
419 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, in force 1 July 2004, CETS No. 185.
420 Gill, Non-Intervention in the Cyber Context, supra note 364 at 228–229.
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As regards the criminal liability for cyber operations, also the Kampala Amendments to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court421 should be mentioned. Article 8 bis of
the Rome Statute covers the crime of aggression, which in paragraph 1 of the Article is
defined as the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression which
constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter. Paragraph 2 references the Definition of
Aggression resolution and repeats the 7-point list of acts that qualify as an act of
aggression. It would thus seem that it would be possible for the Article to cover certain
cyber attacks as well.
421 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, 2187 UNTS 90.
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7 Conclusions
The emergence of cyber attacks is the newest part in the evolution of war and in the
continuum of changes in warfare brought on by technological changes.422 These changes
inevitably challenge the framework on the use of force, as well as other relevant facets of
international law, such as international humanitarian law. The regulation of the use of force
is one of the most controversial aspects of international law,423 and the ambiguity of the
notions of force and armed attack is neither a new phenomenon nor limited to the context
of cyber operations. It is thus no wonder that the introduction of such an ambiguous
concept as cyber attacks into the picture has caused some commotion.
An enormous amount of exaggeration and misconception revolves around the issue of
cyber operations. Many of the examples used in this thesis have been hypothetical, and not
all of them are likely to materialize in the near future. As for the worse ones, we can only
hope that they remain on a hypothetical level. It is easy to agree with Thomas Rid that it
seems unlikely that we will see a pure cyber war in the foreseeable future.424 This,
however, does not mean that cyber attacks will not happen at all or that international law
does not need to concern itself with them. In fact, as cyber operations may very well be
used to prepare the battlefield for a more traditional attack, the question of when a state
may respond to a cyber operation in self-defence is of utmost importance.425
It is clear that cyber operations may constitute a use of force if the scale and effects of the
attack are sufficiently extensive. Considering lex lata, the best criteria in assessing whether
or not the attack constitutes force is the effects-based model. The target-based one would
be rather effortless to apply to cyber operations, but it would expand the notion of force,
and especially that of an armed attack, too far. It also seems to lack support compared to
the effects-based approach. The instrument-based model seems outdated, and its
application to the context of cyber operations is difficult.426
422 Generally on technical developments and war see Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Cyberwar is Coming!, supra 
note 7 at 24.
423 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, supra note 214 at 7.
424 Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, supra note 53 at 174.
425 The Tallinn Manual describes a cyber operation against the air defence of a state in preparation of an air 
campaign as a paradigmatic case. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 63.
426 Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, supra note 36 at 846.
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Applying the effects-based model does then bring up the question of what kind of effects
are enough to constitute a use of force. The Tallinn Manual argues that operations that
cause death, injury, damage or destruction are unambiguously uses of force.427 This,
subjected to a de minimis rule at least on the criterion of damage, is a reasonable and
justified starting point. The harder question involves the attacks with less obvious and
significant consequences. Closely related to this issue is the question of economic force.
The prevailing view is that Article 2(4) does not concern economic force, but as cyber
operations make it very much possible for attackers – be that states or non-state actors – to
inflict even severe economic consequences without any physical damage, the debate might
well be far from concluded. It may even be asked whether or not we are one cyber attack
with catastrophic economic consequences away from the thoughts of Grigorij Tunkin
propelling back to the core of the discussion, this time endorsed by the highly networked
western states who arguably are the most vulnerable to cyber attacks against the financial
system. In other words, the very states who previously argued for the exclusion of
economic force from the ambit of Article 2(4).428
The prevailing view distinguishes between uses of force and armed attacks. It is unclear
where the threshold of an armed attack lies, yet the attack need not necessarily be an
extremely destructive and wide-ranging one: the International Court of Justice did not
exclude the possibility of an attack on a single military ship constituting an armed attack in
Oil Platforms.429 It is also entirely possible for a cyber attack to rise to the level of an
armed attack, and the consensus seems to be that at least attacks with lethal results or
significant property damage do indeed cross the threshold of an armed attack and justify
self-defence on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is again the effects-based view
that is the most logical means of assessing the attack. Cyber attacks that would cross the
threshold of an armed attack are exceptional, and it seems that no attack has thus far done
so.
The question of attribution is especially relevant to cyber attacks due to the technical
nature of the internet and the possibility to mask the origin of the attack. Even if
subsequent analysis would reveal the attacker, the investigation might take months, if not
427 Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual, supra note 21 at 48.
428 Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, supra note 148 at 1.
429 Oil Platforms, supra note 227 at para. 72 and supra at 62.
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longer. It should be kept in mind, though, that while a hacker who steals credit card
information very much has an incentive to hide the origin of the attack and cover his or her
traces, the same does not necessarily apply to states carrying out attacks on each other or
non-state actors carrying out attacks on states. Another issue involves quickly recognizing
and distinguishing the cyber attacks which aim to cause damage from those which aim to
gather information and constitute espionage.
There have been calls for a treaty that would regulate the issue of cyber attacks conducted
by states. It remains to be seen whether such a treaty will materialize, but even if it does
and even if it would bring clarity to the inter-state cyber operations, the question of non-
state actors is likely to remain. And as disagreement remains over the essential issues
outside the context of cyber operations as well, it seems unlikely that states would be able
to reach a convention that would prove to be a panacea. It thus seems that cyber operations
are no exception in this sense either, and the international law concerning them is likely to
evolve in the usual manner, through state practice, scholarly opinions and possible
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as
possible judgments or advisory opinions on the issue by the International Court of Justice.
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